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Introduction 
What is "security"? Does the word "security" possess a precise 
and commonly accepted meaning The concept of security is 
often referred to in no uncertain terms: politicians refer 
elusively to measures which need to be taken in order to increase 
national security and individuals frequently use the term to 
describe a particular feeling of well-being or to denote a state of 
financial health. In fact, security has come to mean so many 
different things to different people that it may have no precise 
meaning at all. In a seminal conceptual piece on security, Arnold 
Wolfers characterizes security as an "ambiguous symbol" and draws 
attention to the potential mischief which the ambiguity of the 
symbol can cause. He argues that "while appearing to offer 
guidance and a basis for broad consensus, ... (the concept of 
security) may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he 
favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name."[1] If 
Wolfers is correct, and security is potentially a deceptive symbol, 
then our options are either to avoid using the concept entirely or 
to begin chipping away at the analytical problems underlying the 
way the concept of security has been conceived of. This paper seeks 
to understand the way the concept of security has been treated in 
the past and to offer some concrete suggestions as to some methods 
or strategies which could be used to enhance security in the 
future. 
Levels of Security?  
Besides experiencing difficulties with putting forward precise 
definitions of security, analysts have found it especially dif- 
ficult to compare one "level" of security with another. For 
instance, what is seen to be a threat to security at the individual 
level might not be significant at the national level of analysis, or 
threats to security which occur at various levels, both state and 
individual, may be responded to at multiple levels of analysis.[2] 
Furthermore, there is not necessarily any connection between 
measures taken to enhance security at one level and increments in 
security at another level - that is, an increase in the aggregate of 
"security" among individual citizens does not always translate into 
greater security for the state or for the leaders of a state.[3] 
Nevertheless, making a distinction for analytical purposes between 
levels of security can help in thinking more clearly about different 
aspects of security: in particular, 
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a distinction between the "individual," "national" and "systemic" 
levels of analysis is made here because these typologies seem to 
offer considerable exploratory power.[4] The paper, therefore, 
is divided into three sections and in each section the "traditio-
nal" approach to the concept of security at that level is con-
sidered; some of the more recent contributions to the concept of 
security at that level are overviewed; and then some suggestions 
regarding methods of enhancing either individual, national or 
systemic security are made. 
The Individual Level of Analysis  
Philosophers have long grappled with the concept of security, 
the roots of insecurity and the conditions which contribute to 
security. Hobbes puts forward, perhaps, the most pessimistic 
exposition of mankind's condition of insecurity. For Hobbes, men 
must live without security, except for what their own strength and 
inventiveness can supply them with, whenever men live in a condition 
of anarchy or "Warre". According to Hobbes: 
During the time men live without a common Power 
to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called Warre and such a 
Warre, as is of every man, against every man 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a 
time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to 
every man; the same is consequent to the time, 
wherein men live without other security, than 
what their own strength, and their own 
invention shall furnish them withal. In such 
condition there is ... continuall feare, and 
danger of violent death; And the life'of man, 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.[5] 
Further complications are created by the fact that, according 
to Rousseau, most methods for self-protection which are undertaken 
in order to increase the individual's own sense of security 
simultaneously menace others. For Rousseau: 
It is quite true that it would be much better 
for all men to remain always at peace. But so 
long as there is no security for this, every-
one, having no guarantee that he can avoid 
war, is anxious to begin it at the moment 
which suits his own interest and so forestall 
a neighbour, who would not fail to forestall 
the attack in his turn at any moment favour-
able to himself, so that many wars, even 
offensive wars, are rather in the nature of 
unjust precautions for the protection of the 
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assailant's own possessions than a device 
for seizing those of others.[6] 
Both Hobbes and Rousseau are preoccupied by the condition of 
physical insecurity in which man finds himself - for Hobbes 
threats to man's physical security, indeed man's survival, are 
derived from man's fearful nature and the lack of an overarching 
authority, while for Rousseau continual physical insecurity is 
dictated by uncertainty about the motives of others. But are 
threats to man's physical security the only kinds of threat 
relevant to individual security? There is no real doubt that 
humans have a basic right to physical security: a right not to be 
subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault.[7] Yet 
even in societies where physical security is relatively assured, 
individuals feel insecure. They may feel insecure because of a low 
sense of self-worth, because of perceptions of threat to their 
family or because of concerns arising out of larger issues 
including fears about population growth, world hunger, or threats 
to the environment. Although these sorts of fears may not, in the 
short-term, threaten the physical security of the individual and 
may, indeed, be a product of the individual's exaggerated fears, 
they can nevertheless exert a deleterious effect. 
Consequently, more contemporary analyses of security have 
attempted to incorporate the notion of subjectively-perceived  
security into the definition of security. For instance, Wolfers 
ultimately defines security in' an objective sense as the absence 
of threats to acquired values," and "in a subjective sense, as the 
absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[8] Christian 
Bay distinguishes further between two types of subjective 
security: "subjective external security" refers to the degree of 
consistent reassurance the individual senses in that he or she, or 
the loved ones, are objectively secure; and "internal subjective 
security" refers to the security deriving from self-acceptance and 
selfinsight.[9] 
Clearly, new concepts of security are beginning to incorporate 
subjectively-rooted assessments of security. Whereas security 
formerly referred primarily to an objective measure of physical 
security, any assessment of individual security must now include an 
assessment of the individual's own sense of security.[10] But are 
subjective and objective aspects of security separable in any 
meaningful way? Any objective assessment of security will be itself 
the product of the analyst's own subjectively-derived ideas about 
the conditions, probabilities and nature of security. Therefore, in 
order to understand more fully the components of contemporary 
notions about individual security, it seems most pertinent to 
explore more fully some facets of subjective security. 
There are a number of problematic aspects to subjective 
security which militate against its conceptual usefulness. First, 
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there remain some doubts about whether absolute subjective 
security is indeed desirable. For instance, Christian Bay points 
out that it may be the case that "modest amounts of anxiety may be 
necessary to keep humans alert and agile, intellectually and 
emotionally."[11] Secondly, we are not certain whether humans 
require some basic level of subjective security in order to function 
nor do we know what effect inadequate amounts of security can have 
on an individual. For example, Abraham Maslow argues that every 
human being has two forces within him. One set of forces clings to 
security or safety; the other set of forces seeks to grow and 
gratify higher needs involved with intellectual and emotional 
"being." What this means, according to Maslow, is that in the choice 
between giving up safety and giving up growth, safety will 
ordinarily win out: "safety needs are prepotent over growth 
needs."[12] 
However, despite Maslow's research, it is still not known to 
what extent the individual's subjective security needs must be 
satisfied before the individual can become a fully functioning 
human being. A third problem with assessing subjective security 
stems from the profound differences among individuals in terms of 
security requirements. Robert Jervis' research on the cognitive 
and motivational processes of human psychology argues that in-
dividuals differ in their subjective security requirements. 
According to Jervis, there are two aspects to assessing subjective 
security requirements: first, individuals differ about their 
perceptions of threats to their security; and second, people differ, 
about how much they value increments of security. Thus, a person 
facing relatively the same threatening conditions as another may 
experience a relatively higher sense of insecurity, or some 
individuals may be more willing to pay a higher price to gain 
increments of security than others.[13] 
If Jervis is correct, and each individual's subjective 
security needs differ, then this would seem to imply that 
strategies and methods which seek to enhance individual security 
will need to be tailored to each individual. This is a daunting 
task, and one which suggests that enhancing security at the 
individual level is, if not impossible, at least practically 
unattainable. However, it must also be remembered that what is 
practically important is not to somehow attain high levels or 
absolute subjective security for each individual, but to devise 
methods and strategies which to some degree enhance the individu-
al's security. In order to do so we need first to understand that 
subjective security is in practical terms immeasurable, except 
insofar as subjective security denotes the absence of subjectively-
felt insecurity. 
Secondly, it is important to assess the different degrees and 
kinds of individual insecurity. By devising policies and 
strategies which alleviate or eliminate individual insecurities, 
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the individual's subjective security can be enhanced in a roundabout 
way. In this context, therefore, strategies which enhance subjective 
security are any actions or policies which ameliorate, remove, or 
reduce the individual's perceptions of insecurity. 
Finally, any attempt to ameliorate insecurity will necessitate 
that we try to understand the physical, psychological and social 
realities of those who are experiencing insecurity, and then try to 
eliminate the causes of their particular insecurities. At first 
glance such an endeavour might also seem overwhelming, but because 
many kinds of personal insecurity will have common causes (i.e. 
poverty, foreboding of nuclear war, worker alienation), the 
elimination or amelioration of some of the root causes of commonly-
felt insecurities can promise quick results in terms of higher 
levels of personal security for all individuals. Therefore, 
whereas the research thus far on individual security seems to have 
been overly preoccupied with the task of somehow defining and 
attaining subjective security, arguably an alternative approach 
which seeks merely to alleviate or eliminate subjectively-perceived 
insecurities may bear more fruit in the form of higher levels of 
individual security all around. 
The National Level of Analysis  
The "traditional" approach to security at the national level 
is embodied in what is referred to as the "realist" paradigm.[14] 
For the realists it is basically a Hobbesian world with no escape 
from eternal conflict. The realist vision of national security is 
based on lessons from history which teach that security is best 
obtained through preponderant military strength, through the 
ability to threaten attack by superior forces and through the 
demonstration of resolve rather than conciliatoriness in the face 
of the enemy.[15] 
Realists can trace through history incidents which demonstrate 
the parabellum doctrine that "if you want peace, prepare for 
war."[16] In a similar sense, realis,t orthodoxy seems to assume 
that if a nation wants security in an anarchical world, obtaining 
superiority of power in the form of weapons is the most preferred 
strategy. Nations are advised, for instance, by the "classical" 
realist thinker Hans Morgenthau to seek the maximum of power 
obtainable under the circumstances because "all nations must always 
be afraid that their own miscalculations and the power increases of 
nations might add up to an inferiority for themselves which they 
must at all costs avoid."[17] 
The realist preoccupation with obtaining security through 
superior strength in a largely anarchic world order is seen in 
definitions of national security which emphasize a nation's ability 
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to deter or sustain an attack. For example, Walter Lipmann writes 
that: 
A nation is secure to the extent to which 
it is not in danger of having to sacrifice 
core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and 
is able, if challenged, to maintain them by 
victory in such a war. This definition 
implies that security rises and falls with the 
ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to 
defeat it.[18] 
The realist preoccupation with security through military 
strength is also manifested in many national security policies,of 
which the best illustration is the national security policy of the 
Reagan adminstration. The origins of the Reagan administration's 
national security policy can be found in the founding statement of 
the Committee on the Present Danger. In the statement, the Soviet 
Union is perceived to be the principal threat to national security: 
"The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the 
cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon 
an unparalleled military buildup."[19] Consequently for the Reagan 
administration, every aspect of U.S. national security policy was 
judged on its capability to protect the United States military from 
the perceived Soviet threat. 
Why do politicians and self-professed "realists" define 
national security in such excessively military terms, and why do 
they resort to such rhetoric about the enemy whenever they talk 
about security? It may be because politicians have found it easier 
to focus the domestic public's attention on military threats to 
security, real or imagined, rather than on non-military ones. 
Certainly it may be easier to build a consensus on military 
solutions to-national security problems than to get agreement on the 
other means of influence that a country can bring to bear on 
problems that it faces. 
Another explanation, however, attributes the militaristic 
rhetoric surrounding national security to deep psychological images 
of the enemy. Patrick Blackett has written that "once a nation bases 
its security on an absolute weapon, such as the atomic bomb, it 
becomes psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute 
enemy."[20] However, it could also be argued that it is first 
psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy before a 
nation can base its security on atomic weapons or weapons of mass 
destruction - that is, a nation's citizens would not tolerate such 
kinds of defence unless they held stark, menacing images of the 
enemy. The psychological roots of enemy imagery have received scant 
attention in the literature[21] but findings in the field of 
attribution theory regarding "mirror imaging" indicate that enemy 
images are the product of human tendencies to believe only the 
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worst about our enemies (and the best about ourselves) and to deny 
information about the enemy which conflicts with strongly-held 
images.[223 
If we reject the realist assumption that military strength 
must be the primary characteristic of any national security policy, 
what are some other emerging visions of national security? Chief 
among the various alternative approaches to national security is 
the idea that disarmament would most contribute to national 
security. Disarmers or abolitionists argue that military capability 
remains associated with national security in the minds of most 
people because of images that are carry-overs from a time in which 
they once had some relationship to international relations, 
however, in reality, "the burgeoning growth of military capabili-
ties has been the chief source of insecurity."[23] 
For disarmers the very process of arming increases tensions 
and exacerbates hostilities. Indeed, the dynamics of such a 
process are described by John Herz and Herbert Butterfield as a 
"security dilemma." Reduced to its essentials, the theory of the 
security dilemma states that attempts by the state or the individual 
to gain security through power accumulation tend to provoke the 
insecurity of others, stimulating them to enhance their security, 
which in turn threatens the security of the other 
side. Thus, the security dilemma describes the measures and  
countermeasures each side takes which can incite a vicious spiral of 
increasing insecurity.[24] The most obvious manifestation of the security 
dilemma is the arms race: one nation's attempt to enhance its security 
through stockpiling weapons may stimulate the nation's adversary to obtain 
more weapons, with the final result that there is less security for both 
sides.[25] 
The idea underlying the security dilemma - that one nation's 
attempt to enhance its security through power accumulation may 
threaten the security of others - seems to have engendered an entire 
school of thought which proposes obtaining national security by 
decreasing or eliminating a nation's preponderant power - that is, 
through unilateral or bilateral disarmament. Essentially, the 
argument is that disarmament can enhance national security by 
reducing each side's fears about preemption, accidental war and 
miscalculated attack, thus contributing to greater security 
overall.[26] Also significant is the notion that disarmament can 
free resources conducive to development, which can in turn enhance 
national security. Thus, in the Final Document of the 1987 United 
Nations Conference on the Relationship between disarmament and 
development it states that: 
Disarmament would enhance security both 
directly and indirectly. A process of dis-
armament that provides undiminished security 
at progressively lower- levels of armaments 
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could allow additional resources to be devoted 
to addressing non-military challenges to 
security, and thus result in enhanced overall 
security.[27] 
The recognition seems to be dawning that security for nations 
no longer means simply devising defence against invasion or nuclear 
destruction. On the contrary, strategies based on disarmament seem 
to hold the promise of higher levels of security overall. 
It was mentioned previously that other concepts of national 
security are being developed in addition to the realist and the 
disarmament perspectives. Another recently emerging approach to 
national security is the concept of "alternative security." 
Alternative security describes a plethora of defence measures 
including neutralism, non-alignment, nuclear-weapons free zones, 
civilian defence, non-nuclear neutral zones and non-provocative 
conventional defence measures.[28] According to a prominent 
exponent of alternative security methods, Ulrick Albrecht, there is 
no consensus as to the exact conceptual meaning of "alternative 
security," or "alternative defence" as it is sometimes referred to, 
"but this lack of conceptual clarity, like that of democracy or 
socialism and other political bywords, does not impair [its] 
political appeal."[29] 
Despite its ambiguous nature, the main underlying purpose of 
proposals for alternative security seems to be to gradually wean 
nations and leaders away from their dependence on force for 
security, not by the direct process of abolishing weapons and the 
military but by the more indirect strategy of substitution. Less 
threatening "non-provocative" weapons, "civilian-based" defence 
systems, "transarmament" plans and a shift toward "disengagement" 
are all alternative security measures which are meant to act as 
interim substitutes for present-day defence systems, which are by 
and large based on nuclear weapons.[30] 
However, one criticism must be made about the entire concept of 
alternative security. The various proposals for alternative security 
are principally intended to enhance the security of small 
states.[31] But it seems that the advocates of alternative security 
systems are mainly seeking changes in the national security policies 
of small states so that if a war should come, and if a war is fought 
on one's own territory, the preservation of the society and 
environment will be possible because comparatively less harmful 
types of weapons will be relied upon for defence and conflict 
escalation levels will likely remain relatively low (i.e. 
below the nuclear threshold).[32] Apparently, the advocates of 
alternative security policies are also preoccupied with the notion 
that national security policies must somehow cope with military 
threats. But, perhaps, the analysis of national security must 
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broaden its focus from thinking only about military threats and 
defences. 
Strategies to enhance or maintain national security must also 
emphasize economic, social, environmental and political 
threats.[33] For example, a nation's security today depends just as 
much on its economic health and on its ability to cope with 
unexpected domestic problems as on its military preparedness. 
Therefore, national security policy must also include emergency 
plans to cope with such threats as interruptions in the flow of 
critically needed resources; a drastic deterioration in environmen-
tal quality or the dwindling of the global supply of resources; 
unprecedented national disasters (i.e. earthquakes); violence in 
Third World countries; urban conflict, (exacerbated, perhaps, by 
the presence of large numbers of poor immigrants and unemployed 
workers); and terrorist attacks. All these types of threats 
endanger the quality of life of a nation and need to be considered 
and prepared for the formulation of every national security policy. 
Another healthy corrective to the current preoccupation with 
defining national security in terms of weapons stockpiles would be 
to define national security policy in terms of the fears which 
one's adversaries may have - that is, to try to recreate the tears 
which a state's enemies may have and then attempt to alleviate 
those fears or insecurities.[34] In this regard the old Jewish 
saying "Fear the man who fears you" is of special relevance: one 
must try to understand the fears felt by other states in order to 
increase one's own national security. Security policies which 
attempt to alleviate the insecurity of adversaries and which 
attempt to prepare for unexpected natural, economic and social 
disasters may, in the end, prove to be more efficacious national 
security policies than either the realist, disarmament-oriented or 
alternative security proposals being circulated today. 
The Systemic Level of Analysis  
During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, diplomats and 
politicians came to realize that a nation's security could be more 
effectively enhanced by allying with other nations. For instance, 
during the 1900s coalitions of nations formed which were variously 
referred to as "balances of power," "concerts" or "alliances." All 
the coalitions however, sought to expand the power and security of 
each member nation-state by uniting its military force with 
other like-minded states.[35] The modern twentieth century 
versions of these kinds of coalitions are referred to as "regional 
security systems" with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) and the Organization of American States (OAS) being the 
most prominent examples of such kinds of regional security sys-
tems.[36] 
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Underlying all these types of coalitions there remains the 
conviction that national security is best preserved and enhanced 
through alliances which can boast of, or demonstrate, 
preponderant military strength. In a sense, security is seen as a 
"zero-sum" game where increases in the military security of one 
alliance or bloc make the other side less secure. However, newer 
approaches to enhancing security at the global level emphasize 
that the pursuit of security can no longer be conceived of as a 
zero-sum game. New systemic-level thinking stresses that nations, 
and opposing blocs of nations, share interests; interests which, 
if threatened or destroyed, would be detrimental to the security 
of both sides. Therefore strategies which increase the security 
of one side, and in doing so also add to the security of the 
other side, are actively sought - it is, so to speak, a global 
security game which need not add up to zero. 
What are some emerging concepts of global security which 
emphasize the existence of common interests? The primary shared 
interest of nations must be to avoid nuclear war, and in this 
regard there have been many proposals which seek to establish a 
type of "common security" based on nuclear-weapon free zones and 
negotiated conventional balances. The report of the Palme Commis-
sion on Common Security, for instance, proposes as a medium-term 
measure the creation in Europe of a battlefield nuclear-weapons 
free zone and a 150 kilometres wide disengagement zone on both 
sides of the NATO-Warsaw Pact demarcation line.[37] 
But there have also been other proposals for security which are 
based on more general, shared interests. For example, Karl Deutsch 
has developed the concept of "security communities": groups of 
states which develop reliable expectations of peaceful relations 
between them and which do not expect or fear the use of 
force (i.e. Canada and the U.S.).[38] And Barry Buzan has 
considered the emergence of "security complexes," in which the 
security interests of a group of states are linked together so 
closely (i.e. Western Europe) that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another, with the result 
that they seem to lie in an "oasis" of relative security compared to 
the rest of the "fractious" international system.[39] 
But one problem with the proposals for common security, 
security communities and security complexes is that they all 
require close physical proximity and/or a degree of cultural 
commonality between the members; one would not speak of a security 
community between Pakistan and Paraguay for instance. In this 
respect, the proposals seem to incline more toward a regionally-
based rather than a systemic-level conception of security. Are 
there any proposals to enhance systemic-wide security which are 
not necessarily based on territorial proximity for their success? 
Recently the term "security regime" has been coined to describe 
the existence of tacit or explicit rules, principals and decision 
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making procedures which exist in order to preserve or enhance shared 
security interests among any and all nations and among international 
organizations. A security regime exists when nations or 
organizations coordinate their behaviour according to shared 
principles, procedures and rules. 
For instance, Nation A and Nation B may seek to control the 
arms competition between them by making up rules and setting up 
interdependent decision-making bodies which constrain each 
nation's pursuit of a larger stockpile of weapons. Besides acting 
as a constraint on each nation's behaviour, continued adherence to 
the regime's rules and principles encourages each nation to 
gradually develop more stable expectations about the other's 
behaviour. Thus, by specifying what constitutes their shared 
interests and then by seeking to coordinate their action so as to 
ensure outcomes based on their shared interests, security regimes 
can serve to strengthen the security of their members, which may 
number anywhere from two to hundreds of member nations and 
organizations. Some examples of successful security regimes are 
the various arms control agreements between the superpowers.[40] 
A resounding strength of security regimes is that their 
creation and maintenance does not rely on "altruistic" or 
"conciliatory" behaviour. Systemic-level thinkers have been 
criticized in the past for their utopian illusions about 
international behaviour and their unwarranted faith in the selfless 
qualities of human nature.[41] But the kind of global thinking which 
advocates the creation of security regimes relies on a nation's 
self-interest or "selfishness' in order for regimes to come into 
being. Security regimes are based on the shared self-interest of 
nations in averting war and preserving peace. 
Unfortunately, however, security regimes are not necessarily 
stable or durable institutions; one nation may violate the rules of 
the regime if it is in its self-interest to do so. Therefore, it is 
argued that the members of a security regime must remain on guard 
against powers arising from within the regime which threaten to 
violate its rules and procedures and they must also be prepared to 
defend themselves against other nations outside the regime which 
may issue military threats or resort to the use of nuclear 
weapons.[42] What kinds of security policies do systemic-level 
thinkers advocate which can combat these kinds of threatening 
scenarios? Arguably, the first priority of a global security 
perspective must be to guarantee that the life, health and survival 
of humanity is assured.[43] But holding to such a principle may 
mean that a nation must demonstrate conciliatoriness (appeasement) 
in the face of a threat from another nation or bloc to attack using 
weapons of massive destruction. 
Therefore, taking a systemic-level perspective on security 
might require taking the viewpoint that in the face of a suf f i- 
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ciently dangerous and potent threat, the sovereignty and indepen-
dence of a nation-state may have to be sacrificed for the sake of 
human survival.[44] In the long run, however, by working to 
establish security communities, security• complexes and security 
regimes we can hope to transform each nation's fixation with 
national security into a preoccupation with first ensuring world  
survival, universal well-being and systemic-wide security. Indeed, 
the evolution toward a systemic-level perspective on security may 
result in a state of affairs where the issuance of a nuclear threat 
or even the contemplation of an attack using weapons of mass 
destruction would be unheard of. 
To effect such changes in the concept of national security is 
a tall order. However, there have been cases in history where 
government policy has been changed to reflect systemic rather than 
national interests because of an enlightened public's concern 
about issues important to global survival (examples are the 
conclusion of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the INF Treaty in 1987). 
Therefore, one force which could effect a change toward a systemic 
security perspective is an informed and determined public. To pin 
our hopes for change on the prospect of a tidal change in world 
public opinion is not entirely utopian because mounting evidence 
indicates that a deep sea-change in world opinion is actually 
taking place. The evidence that leaders are replying to - indeed, 
are being carried along on a world-wide wave of desire for 
security through peace - is seen in the dismantlement of the 
Berlin Wall; the changes in Eastern Europe; the withdrawal of 
troops from Afghanistan; the elections in Nicaragua, Namibia and 
Eastern Europe; the release of Nelson Mandela; the superpowers' 
agreement to eliminate chemical weapons as well as the growing 
movement to negotiate large-scale cuts in carbon monoxide 
emissions. But if there is not, ultimately, an even greater shift 
toward more globally-oriented security concerns in the future, 
including a move to create more security regimes, security 
communities, security complexes and associations based on common 
security, then the game of international relations runs the risk 
of becoming a "negative-sum" game in which all nations and all 
individual citizens feel less and less secure. 
Conclusion 
In order to reach a better understanding of the concept of 
security and so as to suggest some strategies which could more 
effectively enhance security, the differences between individual, 
national and systemic-level approaches to security have been 
considered. It was argued that the focus at the individual level of 
analysis on individual physical security and on objectively and 
subjectively-defined concepts of security could be broadened by 
attention to individual insecurities and the methods and strategies 
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Peacefui-anversion: 
A Training Centre for Peacekeepers 
Across Canada several 
communities are facing the 
closure of nearby military 
bases. In Nova Scotia con-
sultants Peter Langilie and 
Erika V. Simpson devel-
oped the following proposal 
to convert CFB Cornwallis 
to a training centre for UN 
peacekeepers. 
ver the past four decades, Cana-
dian governments have earned con-
siderable respect, both at home and 
abroad, for maintaining an exemplary 
commitment to the United Nations and 
multinational peacekeeping. The award 
of the Nobel prize to both Prime Minister 
Pearson in 1956 and to UN peacekeepers 
in 1988 signifies the sincere appreciation 
of the international community. It can be 
argued that peacekeeping has been the 
least expensive and yet also the most high 
profile commitment of the Canadian 
Armed Forces. Canada's Chief of Defence 
Staff, General de Chastelain, 
acknowledges that peacekeeping is viewed 
by most Canadians as the raison d'etre of 
our defence effort. Professor Albert 
Legault, a Canadian defence analyst, also 
notes that in a 31-one year period 
between 1949 and 1980, the non-re-
coverable cost to Canada for our partici-
pation in peacekeeping operations was 
$266 million dollars, approximately 0.4 
percent of the total defence budget in that 
period. In short, this relatively minor 
investment has brought Canada remark-
able international credit. 
A renaissance of interest in both the 
United Natio* and multinational 
peacekeeping operations has accompanied 
the end of the Cold War. Several 
longstanding conflicts are slowly being re-
solved and there are now greater pros-
pects that peacemaking will follow from 
peacekeeping. Whereas most analysts 
concur that there is a low probability of 
being involved in a major conventional 
war in the near future, there is a high like-
lihood Canada will be involved in a wide 
range of future peacekeeping operations. 
Canada's past Chief of Defence Staff, 
General Paul Manson, acknowledges that 
the demand for Canadian  
peacekeeping expertise is likely to 
continue. He writes: 
With their reputation and experi-
ence, the Canadian forces will surely 
be able to make an important contri-
bution to international stability 
through peacekeeping in the coming 
years. For this effort to be most effec-
tive, however, Canada should work 
with her peacekeeping partners and 
the United Nations to develop new 
and better ways to keep the peace in a 
changing world. (Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, Summer 1989) 
Recent peacekeeping experiences have 
demanded innovation and entailed new 
tasks in areas such as election-monitoring, 
verification, policing and the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. In the aftermath 
of the Gulf war, serious consideration is 
being accorded to expanding the scope of 
operations to include preventive 
peacekeeping, maritime peacekeeping as 
well as the collective security enforcement 
operations that were initially envisaged 
under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. 
Security Council members have 
submitted proposals for the development 
of rapidly deployable stand-by forces. 
Last year, the UN Secretary General 
appealed to member states to identify 
troops and material that can in principle 
be made available to the UN through 
regional co-operation and burden-
sharing. In May 1991, Parliamentarians 
for Global Action also called on gov  
emments to set up UN peacekeeping 
training centres in each region of the 
world. 
The international community is begin-
ning to respond. For example, the Neth-
erlands recently made a commitment to 
allocate air, land and naval forces to fu-
ture UN missions. The Scandinavian 
countries have already established four 
peacekeeping training centres and ar-
ranged cost-saving areas of specialization. 
anada's involvement in nearly every 
UN peacekeeping mission to date has 
provided considerable experience and 
expertise in areas such as communications 
and logistics. Yet insufficient attention has 
been devoted to consolidating, building-
upon or sharing this knowledge. Although 
there are numerous combat training 
facilities in Canada, we have yet to develop 
a peacekeeping training centre. In fact, 
there is no on-going or institutionalized 
peacekeeping training programme in 
Canada. 
In the opinion of several internation-
ally-acknowledged experts, Canada's 
peacekeeping training programme has 
been neglected. With an institutional bias 
toward acquiring combat training and 
equipment, there has been a reluctance to 
devote scarce resources or a facility to 
train for peacekeeping. Brigadier-Gen-
eral Clay Beattie (mt.) credits Canada 
with having great experience and exper-
tise in peacekeeping but as he says, "with 
O C 
,., challenges and tasks, there is 
-a to be done to improve our training 
programme. We can meet the new 
challenges if we are better structured and 
more formally prepared. A number of 
crucial areas now deserve special at-
tention." 
Now, in the event of a peacekeeping 
posting, a one-to-two week programme of 
briefings and seminar instruction is 
usually all that supplements regular train-
ing. More specialized training in the im-
portant areas of conflict resolution and 
negotiation is neglected. Canadian experts 
in this field acknowledge that there are 
problems and risks in deploying 
peacekeepers who have not been pro-
vided with adequate information regard-
ing their posting, the foreign culture, the 
political climate or with basic language 
training. This ad hoc and reactive ap-
proach to preparation is difficult to un-
derstand when there are currently 1,926 
Canadian armed forces personnel de-
ployed to 10 UN peacekeeping operations. 
As former Chief of Defence Staff, 
Admiral Robert Falls, acknowledges, "if 
Canada is going to be in the peacekeeping 
business, it ought to be training people 
adequately for the job." 
The objectivei of a peacekeeping 
training centre are straightforward: it 
would facilitate the development of stan-
dardized training and operational proce-
dures and it would ensure that the neces-
sary expertise and forces were readily 
available. In turn, it would serve to en-
hance the planning and safe management 
of future operations. Lieutenant Colonel 
Christian Harleman, a former 
Commander of the Swedish UN Training 
centre, writes that the purpose of their 
training programme is "to give indi-
viduals and units a wider specialized 
knowledge of their various fields and to 
acquaint them with current security, po-
litical, cultural, religious and ethical con-
ditions in those places of the world where 
they will be called upon to serve." 
The development of a peacekeeping 
training centre would make it possible to 
conduct operational training for officers, 
civilians, and for complete military units 
in their peacekeeping roles. With the ben-
efit of advance training, Canadian forces 
could be much more rapidly mobilized 
and deployed to a theatre of operation. 
A Canadian peacekeeping training 
centre would also offer the opportunity to 
host a larger multinational training 
programme. The co-ordination and co-
operation required in multinational oper-
ations could be pre-planned and re-
hearsed in joint exercises and simulations 
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conducted on the base and in the sur-
rounding communities. Brigadier Gen-
eral William Yost (ret.), Director of the 
Conference of Defence Associations, ac-
knowledges that Canada has a lot to con-
tribute to teaching other armed forces 
about peacekeeping and in this respect 
"we shouldn't hide our light under a 
bushel". 
number of intemationally-recogs 
experts now recommend the 
development of a Canadian centre that 
could also host a multinational 
peacekeeping training programme. Gen-
eral Indar.fit Rikhye emphasizes, "such a 
training centre should not only be for Ca-
nadians, who are invited to almost all mis-
sions, but for other countries, especially 
those who lack the ability and resources to 
organize such a training establishment" 
Lt. Colonel Christian Harleman, 
Canada has a lot to con- 
tribute to teaching others 
about peacekeeping. 
Director of Peacekeeping Operations at 
the International Peace Academy, also 
recognizes Canada's extensive experi-
ence in this field and suggests that it is 
time to support other countries with 
this knowledge and understanding of 
peacekeeping. As well, Sir Brian 
Urquhart, a former Under-Secretary 
General of the United Nations, states: 
[A Canadian peacekeeping training 
centre] could be extremely beneficial 
not only to Canada's participation in 
peacekeeping operations but also to a 
number of neighbouring countries. 
Existence of such a training centre 
for the countries of the Western 
hemisphere could be a great advan-
tage at a time when there is going to 
be increasing demand for peacekeep-
ing contingents from a far wider 
range of countries than hitherto. 
With an identified training centre and 
ear-marked forces, Canada would also 
be well positioned to host one of the first 
UN stand-by forces. As the Honourable 
Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, recently stated, "the 
other major lesson of the Gulf War is 
that if we strengthen the capacity of the 
UN to respond to breaches of security 
more effectively, in the future, we shall 
render such breaches less likely." 
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Joint funding arrangements for multi-
national training could be negotiated 
through the Canadian Government's Mil-
itary Training and Assistance Pro-
gramme (MTAP). At a minimum, partic-
ipating member states would have to be 
responsible for providing return 
transportation and salaries to their 
respective contingents. Indeed, Canada 
could develop such a centre and 
programme without great expense. 
FB Cornwallis is virtually unique in 
already having facilities for this 
type of training. As a longstanding school 
for basic training, it includes an array of 
residences, administrative offices, 
training halls, drill areas, classrooms and 
recreational centres. Given the recent 
decision to reduce recruit enrolment at 
Cornwallis by 56 percent, there will be 
ample space and facilities for a 
peacekeeping training centre. 
Situated on the Annapolis Basin, 
Cornwallis provides easy access to a 
range of resources and terrain. In addi-
tion to the 615-acre-base, there is a 3000-
acre site 10 miles away in Granville that 
currently accommodates a firing range. 
Air transport is presently available 
within 50 miles at CFB Greenwood. An 
underutilized airfield near Digby is 
within 10 miles. The Annapolis Basin and 
nearby Bay of Fundy would also provide 
a challenging environment for future 
maritime peacekeeping training. In 
addition, Cornwallis has an ideal geo-
strategic location for rapid deployment to 
operations'in the Middle East, Central 
America, Eastern Europe, and Africa. 
Over the past 400 years, the surround-
ing Annapolis community has suffered 
numerous violent conflicts, changing 
hands on seven occasions in the struggle 
to establish control over North America. 
From these conflicts a new country 
emerged — Canada a nation that has 
since set numerous international prece-
dents in its commitment to promote 
peace and security. 
The prospect of accommodating a 
peacekeeping training centre would be 
appealing to the local community, the 
larger Annapolis Valley region and the 
province of Nova Scotia. This is a com-
mon security initiative with obvious ad-
vantages to all related parties. As a clear 
commitment to regional development 
and constructive internationalism, the 
decision to develop a peacekeeping 
training centre at CFB Cornwallis would 
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“Canada’s NATO Commitment: 
Current Controversies, Past Debates, and Future Issues” 
Erika Simpson 
Introduction 
Canada has been a committed member of NATO since its founding in 1949. It has 
been one of Canada’s most controversial commitments—as evidenced by the recent 
debate about NATO enlargement and the controversy over NATO’s bombing of Kosovo 
and Serbia. In fact, we can probably expect yet another debate about Canada’s 
commitment to NATO later this year as Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has promised 
to question the Alliance’s continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. There is also bound to 
be future dissension over whether the allies should undertake a ‘second round of 
expansion’, taking in countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. While issues related to 
NATO expansion and the war in Kosovo have dominated the news lately, it is also useful 
to stand back and look at Canada’s overall relationship to NATO. This essay surveys some 
current controversies, past debates, and possible future issues related to Canada’s NATO 
involvement since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. 
Current Controversies 
Expanding NATO Membership could be Risky 
1 
Last spring, before the war in Kosovo, NATO was preparing for its fiftieth 
anniversary celebration in April. The plans were to have a big party in Washington, 
Celine Dion was to sing, and NATO jet fighters were to fly in formation overhead. One 
achievement the allies wanted to celebrate was NATO’s expansion from 16 to 19 
members, taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the first round of NATO 
enlargement. 
NATO expansion had been vigorously opposed by the Russians—every political 
party in Russia was opposed—but at the last moment President Boris Yeltsin agreed not 
to forcefully oppose NATO’s enlargement. Yet the issue still raised a great deal of 
controversy. Expansion was seen by some as a fall-back to regional alliance formations 
and balance of power politics. There were fears it represented a reversal back to the 
policy of containment, to the focus on military force, to collective defence, and possibly 
extended deterrence. Others viewed expansion as a challenge to current efforts, under 
the United Nations (UN) for example, to coordinate security at lower levels of defence 
expenditure. In many respects, the issue of expansion raised other questions about 
priorities and preferences–should we expand a regional collective defence organisation, 
possibly at the expense of efforts to reform a universal collective security organisation, 
like the UN? 
There were others who wrote about the possibility that NATO expansion could 
risk another security dilemma, that efforts NATO made to increase its security could 
lessen Russia’s sense of security, leading possibly to greater tensions, and possibly 
military competition—to another arms race in a divided Europe. Others argued that the 
West was being short-sighted. We—that is the West—were urging Russia to undertake 
2 
onerous democratic and market reforms in a difficult period of transition. At the same 
time, NATO expansion would provide Russian nationalists with another excuse to turn 
back the clock, and reverse reforms. 
Despite these criticisms, plans were made for NATO to expand in any case. But 
the big party last April was cancelled in favour of a quiet meeting about what to do about 
the crisis in Kosovo. The black ties and tuxedos were never unpacked. 
Now that the first round of expansion has taken place, NATO policy-makers must 
forge a consensus among 19 allies—as NATO officially runs by consensus, not majority 
vote—to decide who will be accepted in the ‘second round’. There will still be risks that 
expansion, the first or the promised second round, could lead Russia to eventually move 
some of its conventional or nuclear arsenal into defensive positions along a newly-
defined border, along a new Central Front. 
We also do not know which countries to invite into NATO during the second 
round. Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Bulgaria want 
membership. NATO policy-makers are merely uttering ambiguous phrases right now, 
such as ‘the door is open’ to NATO expansion. Their reluctance stems, in part, from 
concerns about the risk of undermining the credibility of NATO’s article 5. I call article 5 
‘the three Musketeers’ article. It guarantees that an attack against one is an attack against 
all. This is by far the most important article in NATO’s founding treaty. For example, 
during the Kosovo debate, the fact that Serbia’s President had not actually attacked a 
NATO ally was raised as a salient issue. Technically, Mr. Slobodan Milosovic had not 
violated article 5. This important article raises other troubling questions. For instance, if 
Hungary, now a NATO ally, is drawn into a war with Romania over Transylvania, an 
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area over which they have argued for centuries, are we automatically involved? Both 
countries made a great effort to patch up their differences in order to be invited into the 
NATO club. But a few years or decades from now, if they fall into an armed conflict (just 
as Greece and Turkey—NATO allies—have done), would we be left in a quandary about 
our article 5 commitment? 
It is fair to say that NATO expansion posed, and will continue to pose, a daunting 
challenge and commitment; one that is not entirely risk–free. 
The War in Yugoslavia and the Debate at Home: 
Most recently, the Canadian government’s strong support of NATO’s actions in 
Serbia and Kosovo during the war seemed to many to be proof of the country’s loyalty 
to the Alliance. For example, the fact that the Canadian government, along with most of 
the other allies, did not publicly raise doubts and reservations about the decision to bomb 
Serbia and Kosovo was presented by the United States Information Agency as proof of 
these countries’ basic allegiance to NATO .1 
However, the bombing did incite substantial public discussion about the role 
Canada should take in NATO’s management of the crisis in Kosovo and Serbia. It also 
prompted fears about the measure of Canada’s NATO obligations in case the war spilled 
over into the rest of the Balkans. During the crisis in Kosovo, concerns were voiced about 
whether Canada should condone bombing a sovereign country that had not attacked any 
member of the Alliance, and that was technically out of NATO’s territory of 
responsibility. That CF-18 Canadian fighter planes were sent to assist with the aerial 
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bombing of Serbia and Kosovo prompted debate over whether air strikes were necessary 
or morally unjustifiable.2 
Considerable controversy also arose over the prospect of contributing ground 
forces to Kosovo. Many radio hot-line shows burned up the airwaves on this issue, and 
the question of whether we should take in refugees. The Defence Department housed 
thousands of refugees, temporarily, at various Canadian Forces bases. Not surprisingly, 
the possibility of a ground war in the former Yugoslavia incited a great deal ofdebate 
across the country and in the media. 
While it is not yet known whether the federal cabinet was internally divided 
about all these sorts of questions, certain comments by Lloyd Axworthy indicate that, as 
Foreign Minister, he harboured reservations about unequivocally supporting NATO’s 
actions in the Balkans.3 Put simply, the war served to remind Canadians that NATO 
membership entails obligations and commitments that might be difficult to sustain. 
As a NATO member, Canada has been a committed contributor to this 
international organization, and governments have wanted to remain constructively 
engaged for fifty years. But just ask anyone within a relationship and they can tell you 
that any commitment entails obligations—challenging obligations that may be 
comforting at times, while very trying at others—sometimes even grounds for separation 
in more demanding circumstances. It is worth reflecting on how Canada has managed its 
relationship with NATO since the end of the Cold War.4 
Debates since the End of the Cold War 
Challenge and Commitment: 
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The Mulroney government's 1987 Defence White Paper, was called “Challenge 
and Commitment,” or sometimes rather derisively the ‘coffee table white paper’ because 
of its many colour photographs. In 1987 the Defence Department promised a significant 
increase in defence spending—because of, ostensibly, the challenge from the Soviet 
Union—and it promised to strengthen Canada's NATO commitments. Specifically, the 
government intended to acquire a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of 
10-12 billion dollars. It wanted to double our troop strength in Europe and modernise 
our equipment on NATO’s Central Front for high-intensity warfare. Basically, the 
government committed to spend 183 billion dollars on defence over the next fifteen 
years until the year 2002. It was a very expensive package for countering the primary 
threat of the Cold War. 
Then a couple of years later, in 1989, the Conservatives suddenly announced an 
abrupt change in defence policy, freezing defence spending. They cutback major 
capital expenditures. The nuclear submarines were cancelled, as well as new main 
battle tanks, and plans to deploy a division in Europe. It was evident, to almost 
everyone, that the nature of the threat from the Soviet Union—the challenge—had 
changed. We no longer had to, or could, devote so much money and resources toward 
improving our collective defence, particularly our NATO commitments. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the Persian Gulf War in 
the winter of 1991, Canadians continued to debate whether there was any reason for 
Canada to retain its NATO commitments, especially its expensive troop commitment in 
Europe. The government spent approximately 1 billion dollars a year merely to maintain 
our troops in Europe—and that did not include the cost of training and equipping the rest 
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of the Armed Forces, which were also structured primarily for big-league NATO roles, 
including war in Europe, with all the related costs of equipment, training and supply. 
Withdrawal from the Central Front in Germany: 
The government's September 1991 announcement of its intention to withdraw all 
but 1200 troops from the Central Front in Germany came as no great surprise. It was 
estimated that a gradual withdrawal would result in financial savings of some 1.2 billion 
dollars over five years. Then in February 1992, the Minister of Finance announced plans 
to withdraw Canada's contingent from Europe completely. The members of the Canadian 
delegation were given only a few hours’ notice of the change in policy. Initially the 
decision was difficult for them to justify, especially since Prime Minister Mulroney had 
only a few months before assured Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany that Canada 
intended to retain a visible military presence on European soil. The European allies and 
the American military representatives at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) sharply criticised the timing of Canada's decision, particularly as it was taken 
without consulting the other allies through proper channels.5 
On the other hand, Canadian delegates to NATO and SHAPE in Brussels 
consoled themselves by pointing to the significant role Canada's Ambassador to NATO 
was playing in establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). They also 
lauded Canada's commitment to European security through its peacekeeping efforts in the 
former Yugoslavia.6 
Canadian Efforts to Promote NACC and Peacekeeping 
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The idea of according former Warsaw Pact nations associate membership in 
NATO had been broached by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1991. When the possibility of 
associate status was rejected—mainly by Britain and France because of the security 
guarantee it entailed—the Canadian Ambassador to NATO worked to institute a form of 
NATO membership for the Eastern Europeans under NACC auspices.7 
The portrayal of Canada's contribution to the peacekeeping operation in 
Yugoslavia as a renewed contribution to European security was also a source of 
consolation to the Canadians in Brussels, whose efforts were assisted by the high media-
profile of the Commander of the UN Forces, Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie. 
Indeed, it was not long before Canadians at NATO headquarters were receiving requests 
from the other allies, including Americans, for more information on peacekeeping. While 
high-level representatives from allied countries such as Britain and Germany pointed out 
that Canada's most valuable contribution to European security remained the maintenance 
on European soil of troops ear-marked for NATO, in the early 1990s it seemed as if the 
sudden shift of interest to peacekeeping might somehow brighten Canada's image at 
NATO headquarters.8 
Although Canada's status at NATO headquarters appeared to diminish with the 
announcement of the troop withdrawal, the general attitude of the Canadian delegation 
was one of resignation; indications were that the Canadian announcement was a precursor 
to similar announcements of reductions and cut-backs among the other allies. It was clear 
that Canada would remain an active participant in the North Atlantic Council, in the 
hundreds of committees at NATO and SHAPE, and in the discussions surrounding the 
implementation of the ‘New Strategic Concept.’ As NATO’s Secretary-General, 
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Manfred Woerner, assured the allies in February 1992, after the announcement of 
the troop withdrawal, Canada would meet its other commitments to NATO.9 
Canada’s Continuing Alliance Commitments: 
Despite the end of the Cold War, many of Canada's other NATO commitments 
remained unchanged after the 1992 announcement. For instance, the nation retained the 
capability to dispatch an expeditionary brigade group, two squadrons of CF-18s, and an air 
defence battery to Europe. The government was responsible for maintaining a Canadian 
Forces battalion prepared to deploy to Europe with the Allied Command Europe (ACE) 
Mobile Force or the NATO Composite Force. Canadians continued to serve as part of the 
NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and as aircrew 
aboard NATO AEW aircraft. Canadian destroyers and frigates were prepared to sail with the 
Standing Naval Force Atlantic while eleven destroyers and frigates, one supply ship, three 
submarines, fourteen long-range patrol aircraft and twenty-five helicopters retained their role 
in patrolling the North Atlantic as part of NATO's ‘augmentation’ forces. Canada was to do 
its part to defend NATO's Canada-U.S. region a well as contribute to the North American 
Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which is responsible for the defence of NATO's 
largest single land mass. Canada also offered the allied countries its facilities and territory for 
military training, such as those at CFB Goose Bay in Labrador and CFB Shilo in Manitoba, 
and the underwater naval testing range at Nanoose Bay in British Columbia.10 
The Conservative government continued to demonstrate its support for NATO 
through other means. The portion of the infrastructure budget at NATO headquarters paid 
by Canada, although not widely known, was viewed at NATO headquarters as a significant 
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contribution. The government's intention to retain approximately 650 Canadian personnel at 
NATO and SHAPE as military planners, attachés, and representatives on the Canadian 
delegation was also seen to be an important commitment. And the announcement regarding 
the renewal of a ten-year contract to train approximately 6,000 German Armed Forces 
annually at CFB Shilo and CFB Goose Bay was described as yet another example of 
Canada's intention to help strengthen the Alliance. Although aboriginal residents 
complained about the environmental effects of low-flying jets, and Goose Bay was slated to 
be closed as the United States deemed it too expensive for training purposes, German and 
other NATO planes continued to train at this base.11 
The Chretien Government’s Defence Review: 
In November 1993, the new Liberal government of Jean Chretien announced a 
comprehensive review of Canadian defence policy, precipitating another debate about 
Canada’s NATO commitments. By February 1994, a Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and House of Commons was established to initiate consultations and report to the 
government. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence 
Policy, some policy-makers continued to argue that the Alliance had to remain a priority 
for both defence and foreign policy. They emphasised the wide array of new conflicts in 
the world, particularly in Europe, the instability of the Russian leadership, and the 
remaining military threat. They advised that the government ensure the country had 
modern military equipment and sufficient tri-service personnel to fulfill the strategic 
requirements of deterrence as well as NATO's New Strategic Concept. Canada, they 
argued, must continue to structure and train its military for mid-to-high intensity combat 
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operations. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee, they acceded that Canada 
should contribute to United Nations' peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, but such 
contributions should remain a low priority for the Canadian Forces relative to their 
general combat capability for defending Canada and its allies. As some argued, the 
alternatives posed a risk to security and stability as well as to Alliance relations. In their 
opinion, NATO was adapting to this new environment of uncertainty, and NATO alone 
retained the political coherence and military capabilities to ensure collective defence and 
security.12 
Others argued that NATO was now less a priority given the disintegration of the 
Soviet military threat and the disappearance of both the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. They 
noted the unlikelihood of an attack across Europe's Central Front, and frequently cited the 
historic inability of military alliances to combat diffuse threats such as ethnic conflict, 
environmental degradation, and human rights violations. Some suggested that Canada 
should de-emphasize its military commitments to NATO while retaining a diplomatic and 
consultative presence in the higher councils of the Alliance. Alternatively, many favoured 
increasing Canada's foreign aid and contributions to UN agencies and operations. There 
were also related proposals for new defence priorities that would emphasize the 
monitoring and surveillance of Canadian territorial waters and air space as well as expand 
the country's commitment to peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. Rather than 
attempt to maintain a general-purpose, combat-capable army, navy, and air force, there 
were calls for specialization. Accordingly, Canadian Forces should be restructured and 
retrained in order to contribute more productively to peacekeeping and the various 
initiatives outlined in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace. Given this new 
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environment, there would be unnecessary risks and expenses in adhering to the 
prevailing assumptions, practices, and institutions of the past fifty years.13 
In the midst of this defence review, the government announced its commitment 
to the conversion of Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis in Nova Scotia into a 
multinational training centre for UN and NATO-affiliated personnel. At the new Lester 
B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the government 
planned to sponsor some training for military and civilian personnel from countries 
participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace, as well as from developing countries 
under Canada's Military Training Assistance Program. This decision provoked yet more 
controversy about peacekeeping training and the advisability of establishing a privatized 
peacekeeping training centre.14 
NATO and the 1994 Defence White Paper 
In December, the Department of National Defence released The 1994 Defence 
White Paper, announcing that Canada would remain a full and active member of NATO. 
The monolithic threat to Western Europe had disappeared, and the principal responsibility 
for European defence lay with the Europeans, but at the same time, the government valued 
the transatlantic link and recognised that the Alliance had made progress in adapting to a 
post-Cold War world. The White Paper noted in particular those aspects of NATO that 
reflected a cooperative approach to European security relations, including the creation of 
NACC, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the development of the Combined Joint Task 
Force Concept. According to the White Paper, this perspective on NATO ‘underpinned’ 
the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a 
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crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces Canada maintained for all multilateral 
operations would immediately be made available to NATO.15 Yet for the first time, the 
Defence Department consistently referred to Canada’s NATO defence commitments 
after pointing out the country’s UN obligations. This seemed to herald a fundamental 
reordering of Canada’s defence priorities.16 
The Costs of NATO Enlargement: 
Predictably, the release of this White Paper in 1994 did not terminate the debate 
over the measure and extent of Canada's NATO commitments. Gradually some high-
level foreign and defence policy advisors became concerned about the costs of NATO 
enlargement for Canada. Prime Minister Jean Chretien initially supported expanding 
NATO membership from sixteen to twenty member states (adding Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and Slovenia). However, estimates of the costs of enlargement tended to 
vary widely, in part because of uncertainty about the number of new members that 
should be admitted. Nevertheless, in 1997 many high-level American officials agreed 
that NATO expansion would cost somewhere between US$27 billion and US$35 billion 
over the next 13 years. Would Canada’s defence costs jump with NATO enlargement? 
Behind-the-scenes, some senior policy-makers worried about the looming costs of 
NATO expansion in the twenty-first century, and about the extent to which Canada 
should or could support the rebuilding of the newer allies’ defence systems. In the weeks 
prior to ratification of the enlargement decision in the United States Congress, the US 
State Department concurred with NATO’s revised assessment that enlargement could 
cost only $1.5 billion rather than $27-35 billion. Yet these wide variations in estimates 
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among such reputable analysts as the United States Congressional Budget Office, the 
Pentagon, the State Department, and NATO headquarters raised more questions about the 
measure of Canada’s NATO commitments, and about whether all these estimates might 
prove to be low. Even as the Alliance opened the door to the first round of expansion, 
many Canadians worried about the potential cost of Canada’s NATO obligations.17 
Future Issues 
NATO’s Nuclear Strategy and the Middle Powers Initiative: 
One issue that promises to incite further controversy revolves around Canada’s 
critique of NATO’s reliance upon nuclear deterrence strategy. The NATO Summit in 
Washington last April opened the door to a broad-ranging review of NATO’s nuclear 
weapons policy. NATO’s New Strategic Concept, which since 1991 has reaffirmed the 
Alliance’s commitment to relying upon nuclear weapons, will be reviewed and re-
examined. Pressure from the leaders of the Middle Powers Initiative and the Non-
Nuclear Weapon States, particularly from key policy-makers in Canada, Germany, 
Sweden, Norway, and Japan, may result in a serious review of the Strategic Concept. In 
particular, key policy-makers from the Middle Powers Initiative could influence NATO’s 
decision-making regarding its nuclear commitments, leading to important and subtle 
shifts in the Alliance’s deterrence strategy over the period between 2000-2002. 
The issue that NATO has promised to review is of historical, practical, as well as 
theoretical interest. After fifty years of relying upon nuclear weapons for our defence, 
recent developments, including the end of the Cold War, have presented an opportunity 
to enter the new millennium with a plan for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Many 
14 
distinguished world figures are arguing that the risk of retaining nuclear arsenals in 
perpetuity far outweighs any possible benefit imputed to nuclear deterrence. They 
believe that the end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to 
eliminate nuclear weapons, an opportunity that must be exploited quickly or it will be 
lost. They see the Middle Powers Initiative as a bold attempt to encourage NATO 
leaders to ‘break free from their Cold War mindsets’ and move rapidly to a nuclear 
weapon-free world. 
Hundreds of international and nongovernmental organisations have focused on 
abolishing nuclear weapons, and to buttress this grassroots effort the Middle Powers 
Initiative was launched in 1998. Countries without nuclear weapons coalesced and are 
now lobbying the nuclear-armed nations to disarm themselves. Canadian Senator 
Douglas Roche is the chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative, and joining Canada as 
members are other non-nuclear weapon states, such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, 
Japan, and Mexico. Whereas NATO’s Strategic Concept has hardly changed on the issue 
of maintaining reliance upon nuclear weapons since 1991, the Washington Summit 
Communiqué, issued by NATO heads on April 24, 1999, committed NATO to ‘review’ 
its strategic policy. At a news conference on April 24, Foreign Minister Axworthy 
confirmed the willingness of NATO “to have a review initiated” of its nuclear weapons 
policies. Explaining that this was the thrust of the recommendations that came out of the 
report of Canada’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Axworthy added: “It’s a message that 
the [Canadian] Prime Minister took [to] certain NATO leaders... I think we have now 
gained an acknowledgement that such a review would be appropriate and that there 
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would be directions to the NATO Council to start the mechanics of bringing that 
about.”18 
This gives the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, and the 12 abstainers on the New 
Agenda Coalition’s 1998 resolution at the UN, a new opportunity to press for a ‘quality 
review’, not a perfunctory one. Members of the Middle Powers Initiative, headed by 
Senator Roche, believe that the NATO communiqué strengthens the possibility that 
appropriate representations can be made to a number of important countries around the 
world. Indeed, it was Canada, in its official policy statement, that urged NATO to begin a 
nuclear weapons review, and this was carried into the NATO Summit. Members of the 
Middle Powers Initiative are expected to press for further changes to NATO’s deterrence 
strategy in the near future.19 Success will depend on whether a new coalition of leaders 
from countries respected by the Nuclear Weapon States—especially by the United 
States—generates sufficient political momentum and media attention. 
Conclusion 
Canada’s policy record since the end of the Cold War indicates that we will 
remain committed to NATO, but on somewhat different terms than before. One seldom 
reaches the silver or golden anniversary in any relationship without experiencing doubts 
and the occasional shift in terms of commitment. Still, as many concede, this has been a 
relatively successful alliance over the last fifty years. The challenge for Canada, once 
again, is to remain constructively engaged—to chart a safer course—and to ensure 
NATO responds cost-effectively and responsibly. Canada must remind the other NATO 
allies that some arguments, controversy, debate, and dissension can and should be 
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expected in what is alleged to be a democratic relationship—indeed, they may 
help improve this longstanding institution. 
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Essays 
New Threats to the Alliance's Security 
and Strategies to Reform NATO 
gy: Erika Simpson 
ATO needs a much greater transformation of 
its structures and procedures if it is to serve 
the common security interests- of the allies 
and others. Traditional policies should be seriously 
reconsidered and perhaps drastically reevaluated. Old 
ways of thinking no longer apply to the world in which 
we live. This article suggests new types of threats to 
allied security and proposes alternative strategies to 
reform NATO so as to enhance international security. 
CONDUCT INDEPENDENT THREAT ANALYSIS 
For decades, NATO's assessment of threats has been shaped and 
influenced by American military threat analysis. This development 
was not considered a serious problem until recently. As George 
Bush explained during the second presidential debate with John 
Kerry: "We all thought there was weapons 
there, Robin. My opponent thought there was 
weapons there. That's why he called him a 
grave threat. I wasn't happy when we found 
out there wasn't weapons, and we've got an 
intelligence group together to figure out 
why."1 While Prime Minister Tony Blair has 
been largely exonerated for taking American 
intelligence at face value, many will not 
accept this sort of backhanded logic in future 
wars. In the future, domestic publics will 
demand hard evidence of a country's 
professed transgressions, even if American 
politicians argue that such evidence exists but 
cannot be released for security reasons. Some 
of the lessons of the war against Iraq are that NATO allies need to 
undertake more of their own independent military threat analysis. 
They need to institute the infrastructure and procedures necessary to 
carry out such independent threat analysis and share their findings.2 
Erika Simpson is an associate professor of international relations 
and international security in the Department of Political Science at 
the University of Western Ontario (simpsonftwo.ca). She is the 
author of many articles on NATO (available at httpapflub-
lish.uwo.cat-simpsonl) and of the book, NATO and the Bomb 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001). 
SHARE ALTERNATIVE THREAT ASSESSMENTS 
AND INTELLIGENCE 
In conjunction with United Nations monitoring agencies 
and international watchdog institutes, NATO could 
unite with like-minded nations to provide the UN 
Security Council with timely and accurate threat assess-
ments based on new information and possibly conflict-
ing analysis of the threat. Such alternative threat assess-
ments could play a valuable role in reducing tensions 
and defusing arms spirals in the weeks and months pre-
ceding possible multilateral or unilateral actions (such 
as air strikes). 
Naturally, critics will retort that sharing intelligence, 
especially contrary evidence on the nature of the threat, 
will not necessarily prevent the US administration from 
undertaking preemptive or unilateralist measures. For 
many American diplomats, the lessons of the Kosovo 
campaign in 1999 and the Franco-German rebuff in 2003 
reinforced their belief that NATO is far too cumbersome 
and bureaucratic. Now that targets have to be approved 
by 26 members, "coalitions of coalitions"3 may seem 
more practical, as exemplified by the United States' 
,
'coalition of the willing" in Iraq. Even if one or more of 
the non-US NATO allies puts forward contradictory 
evidence about the nature of the threat, the US and 
members of its "fast alliance" may choose not to accept 
such evidence. A great deal will depend on the quality of 
the intelligence and in this respect, France, Germany, and 
the UK could have a lot to offer. NATO headquarters 
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interpretations of threats are encouraged among the 
twenty-six allies. 
PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONCILIATION 
THROUGH NATO 
Admittedly, fostering an atmosphere of conciliation and 
acceptance may take a long time. As the Ditchley 
Foundation concluded in a recent discussion of NATO's 
future role: "Whatever the underlying causes, most of us 
agreed that this level of transatlantic insult had not been 
seen before and that it had contributed to an unnecessary 
crisis, the effects of which would be with us for some 
time. There was a good deal of broken crockery about."4 
During the presidential debates, John Kerry appealed to 
American citizens to vote for him, stating "I believe 
America is safest and strongest when we are leading the 
world and we are leading strong alliances."5 He 
criticized George Bush for attacking Iraq too quickly 
before ensuring a strong coalition was in place. In the 
future, another important way to promote an atmosphere 
of conciliation would be for the United States (and 
Canada) to refrain from viewing threats to North 
American security as markedly different from, and more 
important, than threats to Europe. 
The failure of the nuclear weapon 
states to implement their Non-
Proliferation Treaty obligations means 
that many countries, like Iran and North 
Korea, have the rationale they seek to 
obtain nuclear arsenals of their own. 
DECLINE PARTICIPATION THROUGH NORAD IN 
SPACE-BASED PROGRAMMES 
After the Cold War's end, the decline of the Soviet threat 
meant that the North American Aerospace Defence 
Command (NORAD) was no longer as important to North 
American security. But now some argue that preparing 
for possible warfare in space is necessary, and the US 
(possibly in conjunction with Canada) should work 
through NORAD to develop space-based interception 
capabilities. In Europe and Canada, concerns have long 
been raised about possible contributions to the US 
military's global surveillance, warning, and 
communications systems. As one observer has pointed 
out, the American government needs to be especially 
careful that it is not perceived to be intent upon erecting 
some kind of "Fortress America."6 Accordingly, NATO 
governments should maintain official positions of non-
participation in the US missile and space-based defence 
programme because it is not configured in a manner 
consistent with international disarmament and prolifer-
ation interests and the prevention of weaponization of 
space. In addition, the allies should organize preliminary 
discussions on the contents of a treaty on the prevention 
of an arms race in space. Such a treaty could build on the 
longstanding commitment of most of the world's states to 
the basic tenets of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(although the Bush and Putin administrations chose to 
abandon the ABM Treaty). Of course, US government 
participation in such discussions is unlikely at present, 
but many states with space capabilities might participate. 
And if discussions were organized to ensure 
representation by non-governmental entities, including 
corporate space interests, US corporations with an inter-
est in non-weaponized space might participate. Such 
discussions could set the groundwork for actual treaty 
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament or else-
where when conditions for progress are more propitious.7 
SAVE THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
TREATY (NPT) FROM CHARGES OF HYPOCRISY 
The failure of the nuclear weapon states to implement 
their NPT obligations under Article VI of the NPT 
means many countries, like Iran and North Korea, have 
the rationale they seek to obtain nuclear arsenals of 
their own. As a result, the upcoming "Third Review 
Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" (RevCon) 
faces daunting challenges. The original nuclear 
weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France, and China) 
have not lived up to their obligations under Article VI 
of the NPT to move decisively toward the irreversible 
elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Such inaction 
"invites charges of hypocrisy when these same 
countries seek to deny access to nuclear technologies to 
nonnuclear weapons states - and moreover, threaten and 
carry out military preemption to prevent the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons by other countries as in the case of 
the US and UK concerning Iraq."8 
Prior to the NPT's Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) 
meeting at the UN in 2004, the Middle Powers Initiative 
(MPI) and Pugwash Canada sponsored a roundtable for 
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Canadian officials and NGO representatives. The paper Building Bridges: The Non-
Proliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies is based on this event. It 
recommended building bridges between NATO member states and those of the New 
Agenda Coalition, which focuses on nuclear disarmament. The aim is to strengthen the 
"moderate middle" of the nuclear debate. It discussed building a bridge between the nuclear-
weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states to .)pen the road to substantive 
disarmament and non-pro:feration progress. It also made recommendations regarding 
Canada's role and responsibilities with respect to the US ballistic missile defence project and 
Tossible weaponization of space.9 
Hight NATO states calling for more speed in implementing com-
mitments to the NPT supported a New Agenda Coalition resolution 3t the 
UN. They built a bridge on he long road to nuclear disarmament. The 
bridge gained extra trength when Japan and 
South Korea joined with the NATO 8 - 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and 
Turkey. These states, along with the New 
Agenda countries Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, 
Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Sweden - now form an impressive centre in 
the nuclear weapons debate and can play a 
determining role in the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.10 
Lust as Canada and Germany took the lead in NATO 
by asking the Alliance to review its reliance on 
deterrence, the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, 
the New Agenda Coalition, and the Middle Powers 
Initiative will play a significant role. Seven NATO 
states have -wined with Canada, which for two years 
had stood alone in NATO in supporting the New 
Agenda resolution. The fact that such important NATO 
players as Germany, Norway, The Netherlands and 
Belgium have also now taken a proactive stance 
indicates that they want to send a message to the US to 
take more significant steps to fulfilling commitments 
already made to the NPT. As retired Canadian Senator 
Douglas Roche, thair of the MPI states, "The situation 
the NPT finds itself in is so serious and the threat of 
nuclear terrorism -93 real that governments need to put 
aside their quarto& and power plays and take 
meaningful steps to ensure that the NPT will not be 
lost to the world dough erosion."11 
MAINTAIN LOW LEVELS OF DEFENCE SPENDING 
The European allies in NATO and Canada have made laudable efforts to decrease 
their defence spending. Since 2001, the non-US NATO members' spending on 
NATO has been less than 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Over the last 
three years, however, the United States has laid out 3.6 percent of its GDP on its 
defence commitments worldwide. Canada expended 1.2 percent, approximately the 
same percentage as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
and Spain. The Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, and the UK 
ranked at or above this average. All other NATO members fell below this average 
highlighting the fact that American remonstrations to spend more are failing to 
convince.12 
For example, Germany is making drastic cuts in 
equipment and slimming down its organizational 
structures; its focus has switched to peacekeeping, 
crisis management, and the war against terrorism, 
rather than defending itself from Cold War attacks. 
Similarly, Canada has refrained from markedly 
increasing its defence spending on capital and 
equipment in favour of a modest increase to the 
number of available peacekeepers. Even US 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld acknowledges that big-ticket costly weapons 
systems are unlikely to find Osama bin Laden or prevent a terrorist attack. When US 
army officials expressed confidence that they would capture bin Laden in 2004, "they 
cited better intelligence - not powerful new arms - as the basis for their optimism."13 
Increasing defence spending to American levels is not an option for responsible poll-
cymakers. 
Although some European and Canadian defence lobby-
ists bemoan lower levels of defence spending, domestic 
publics will not tolerate higher levels. The newer allies 
will have a tough time coming up with the money to 
bring their militaries up to NATO's basic standards of 
interoperability. In the biggest defence contract by a for-
mer Soviet bloc country since the end of the Cold War, 
Poland agreed to buy 48 US-made F-16 jet fighters for 
US$3.5 billion. Such modernization will cost Poland 
about $7.76 billion through 2012. Like Poland, all the 
new allies are facing steep modernization costs to 
replace obsolete or inadequate equipment. But the target 
force goals they agreed to with NATO prior to joining 
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the Alliance are proving difficult to reach.14 (Those 
goals, outlining the contribution to the Alliance that 
each member intends to make, are classified by NATO). 
CALCULATE DEFENCE SPENDING FAIRLY 
In forthcoming analysis of the allies' abilities to meet an agreed-on set 
of pledges related to their capabilities, the "Prague Capabilities 
Commitments," the NATO countries need to consider alternative sorts 
of commitments-such as UN and NATO-sponsored peacekeeping 
because they improve the Alliance's military preparedness and close 
the spending gap between the US and 
its European allies. Even the EU's 
efforts to field a rapid-reaction force of 
60,000 personnel should count as a 
monetary contribution to NATO's 
security. After all, the United States 
calculates the percentage of GDP 
spent on NATO incorporating all US 
defence spending worldwide - 
including US spending in the Middle 
East on defence and American foreign 
military assistance to Columbia. It 
makes sense to reply to American 
concerns about burden-sharing by 
asking NATO officials to calculate 
spending estimates on all types of 
defence expenditures, particularly 
peacekeeping under NATO and UN 
auspices. 
CONTRIBUTE MORE HEAVILY 
TO PEACEKEEPING UNDER NATO AUSPICES 
Most of the NATO allies, including the United States, 
are participating more heavily in peacekeeping under 
NATO auspices than in the past. Recent new NATO 
missions include commanding the International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan and assisting in 
Poland's command of a NATO-supported peacekeeping 
force in Iraq. NATO is also improving its ability to act 
far beyond Europe and North America through a major 
restructuring that includes cutbacks at NATO headquar-
ters in Belgium and a stronger presence in the United 
States. A command centre in Norfolk, VA, "Allied 
Command Transformation," is overseeing this 
modernization. More robust, rapidly deployable 
capabilities will change NATO into a much more 
nimble, deployable, action-oriented organization. The 
most significant development has been the institution 
of a 20,000-strong "NATO Response Force," ready to 
deploy within days. 
At the same time, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is contributing 25,000-
32,000 alliance and non-alliance troops. And until mid-2003, the NATO-led 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina included about 13,000 NATO 
and non-NATO troops. In June 2003, the forces were reduced to 7,000 and since 
the end of 2004, the mission has been 
transferred to the EU. Furthermore, NATO 
members have been 
patrolling the 
Mediterranean since the terrorist 
attacks of 2001, a mission 
called Operation 
Endeavour. 
But the risk is that as NATO involves its 
allies in more and more "out-ot-area" 
operations similar to those in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and now Iraq, the rest of the 
world may come to perceive NATO 
peacekeepers as defenders of the 
American empire. As such, while NATO 
should continue to increase its 
commitment to peacekeeping, there needs 
to be a complementary return to the UN as 
the chief guarantor of safety. This will help 
to avoid the widespread perception that the "NATO club" consists mainly of 
Northern, "rich," "white" nations based in North America and Europe. 
RETURN TO THE UN WITH INCREASED FUNDING AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SHIRBRIG AND A FUTURE UN 
EMERGENCY SERVICE 
The UN continues to experience a funding crisis due to 
member states' failure to honour their financial obliga-
tions. Member states of the UN invest an average of 
$1.40 in UN peacekeeping activities for every $1,000 
spent on their own armed forces. For example, for 
every dollar that it has invested in UN peacekeeping, 
the United States has tended to spend over $2,000 on 
its own military.I5 The NATO allies need to contribute 
more money and personnel to UN peacekeeping or run 
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the risk of being accused of trying to channel all actions 
through NATO peacekeeping. One effective way to do 
this would be to contribute standby forces and equip-
ment to the UN's Standby High Readiness Brigade 
(SHIRBRIG). Sixteen countries are members of the 
brigade, which successfully monitored the ceasefire 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but more contributors and 
resources are needed. While SHIRBRIG aims to provide 
the UN with a jump-start, rapid deployment force of as 
many as 5,000 troops within 30 days notice, plans are 
The risk is that as NATO involves its allies 
in more and more "out-of-area" operations 
similar to those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
and now Iraq, the rest of the world may 
come to perceive NATO peacekeepers as 
defenders of the American empire. 
afoot to establish a UN Emergency Service (UNES). It 
would be a UN 911 that could avert genocide and armed 
conflict worldwide, not just in Sudan and Rwanda but in 
all regions of the world, including NATO's backyard. 
While NATO's new "Rapid Reaction Force" runs the risk 
of being perceived as US-led and status quo oriented, 
each participating state in SHIRBRIG would reserve the 
right to decide whether to deploy national personnel on a 
case-by-case basis. This would ensure that its final 
composition would be wider and more inclusive. 
Moreover, UNES would be composed of professional 
volunteers, military police, and civilians working directly 
for the UN. This would reduce the pressure on national 
decision-making and the immediate demand for national 
armed forces in UN peace operations.16 
CONCLUSION 
NATO has limited time and a small window of oppor-
:unity to take advantage of its fairly benign reputation. 
it is highly unlikely that this regional military alliance 
rill be seen in such a positive light ten years from now. 
Right now, NATO is well-situated to make the impor-
:ant changes proposed in this article because the NATO 
allies did not acquiesce to American pressure to join the 
war on Iraq. It was evident from France, Germany, 
Belgium, and Canada's reluctance to join the war that 
not everyone could agree on the best methods and most 
efficient means of achieving commonly valued objec-
±ves, including ousting Saddam Hussein. The important 
lesson is that every NATO ally - not just the current 
hegemon - now has a duty and responsibility to put 
forward alternative proposals to enhance international 
and national security. The foreign ministers of the 
allied powers may not be able to summon fleets of 
frigates in aid of their diplomacy or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons, let alone decide to use them. But 
they can carry briefcases stocked with practical 
proposals and promises of more money to put toward 
alternative strategies. - 
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 Here’s advice on how to get started 
hen Erika Simpson 
finished her PhD 
dissertation in political 
science at the University 
of Toronto in 1995, she knew her 
experience could help other graduate 
students in the throes of thesis writing, 
Soon after, as a newly minted professor 
teaching international relations in the 
political science department of the 
University of Western Ontario, she 
realized that the lessons she learned 
would be helpful to the graduate 
students 
suggestions from the graduate work-
shops for MA and PhD political science 
students at Western and comments from 
several colleagues, she wrote a 
document of useful advice for would-be 
thesis writers. It now serves as a 
W 
hand-out for all grad students in West-
ern’s political science department (even 
though it’s not “official departmental 
policy”). Many of her observations are 
also applicable to graduate students in 
other departments, especially in the 
social sciences. 
This is a shortened version of Dr. 
Simpson’s document. The original 
version, including references, can be 
found at http://publish.uwo.ca/~simpson/ 
publish/ on the Web. 
hen embarking on a thesis, it’s 
essential to choose a topic early 
and give yourself plenty of time to do 
your preliminary research. You’ll need 
to scan the latest journals and books 
related to your interests and search the 
Internet to determine whether anyone 
has already written extensively on your 
topic, and who the main authors are in 
your area. Also make sure you review at 
least three other theses in your depart-
ment’s collection or the university 
library. Ask yourself how much theory 
you want to incorporate into your thesis, 
how widely relevant you want it to be, 
and what potential employers might 
want to see on your resumé. 
In framing a research question, you 
need to pin down exactly what it is you 
want to find out, and what problem you 
will examine. For example, if you are 
interested in improving United Nations 
peacekeeping efforts and you would like 
to work for the UN, your question might 
be: How has the UN financed its 
peacekeeping operations? 
Once you’ve done your early 
research and framed a relevant question, 
prepare a brief written statement for 
your supervisor, defining concepts 
where necessary. Think about whether 
your research question can be further 
narrowed down. 
Outline the topic’s significance: Is 
it timely? Does it relate to a practical 
problem? Does it fill a research gap? 
Does it relate to broader theoretical 
principles or general theory? Does it 
sharpen the definition of an important 
concept or relationship? Does it have 
implications for a wide range of 
practical problems? 
You’ll also need to establish 
whether your question is related to a 
theoretical problem, previous 
theoretical research, or a debate in the 
literature. Discuss whether you will 
present the theory (including the 
parts, whether you will make 
theoretical propositions in the 
introduction or discuss theoretical 
implications in the conclusion, and 
indicate whether you are writing a 
theoretical and/or policy-relevant 
thesis. 
You may prefer an alternative 
research methodology (for example, an 
interpretive, critical, comparative, or 
historical approach). But by at least 
attempting to answer the following 
questions, you should make significant 
progress in designing your research 
project. Moreover, you may encounter a 
thesis examiner who wants to know 





you need to 










variables are. Try to assert your pro-
positions in the form of one-sentence 
hypotheses. Now ask the hypotheses 
in the form of questions. Do any of 
your propositions overlap and can 
any questions be eliminated? Do 
they make common sense or are they 
far-out and controversial? 
Although you don’t need to use a 
positivist explanation, you should think 
about your possible independent, 
intervening, and dependent variables. If 
you want to explain the dependent 
variable B, then ask why does B occur? 
you suspect are the most significant 
independent variables? Can you argue 
that given A, you expect B will occur? 
Are there exceptions? Can you narrow 
your list of independent (and 
intervening) variables to include only 
those most significant? What evidence 
could you turn up to prove or disprove 
your propositions? What might lead 
you to reject your propositions? What 
levels of analysis will you study? 
If you decide to use the case-study 
approach, ask yourself whether your 
case selection was biased, and 
recognize that many theses end up with 
fewer case studies than initially 
planned. If the bulk of your evidence 
comes from logical reasoning (for 
example, game theory or rational 
choice theory), determine what 
counter-arguments seem to oppose or 
contradict your reasoning. Or, if your 
method is more historical or 
interpretive, ask how much detailed 
chronological explanation you need. 
What scale will you use to measure 
significant factors or variables (such as 
quantitative, semi-quantitative, 
qualitative)? Will you undertake the 
kind of research necessary to measure 
your variables (for example, 
mathematical, survey, public opinion, 
in-depth interviews, content analysis)? 
Are any important concepts in need of 
measurement (intensity, frequency, 
amount, number)? How will you assess 
the measure of change, significance or 
importance? 
Year-round research 
Once your topic is chosen and 
approved, you need to step up your 
research efforts, and continue them 
year-round, not only in the crucial 
months before the final deadline. 
Don’t be discouraged if, at the 
beginning, you are overwhelmed by 
too much information. Your most 
highly relevant research may take 
place in the weeks and months 
leading up to the penultimate draft. 
Remember that you are looking for 
patterns and trends, and that you 
must think about how you will 
structure your analysis. Think about 
all the alternative approaches you 
could take, and be prepared to 
defend your chosen method. 
You are moving toward being able 
to make theoretical and policy-relevant 
conclusions, and you need to be 
confident of your conclusions and 
W 
 your research methodology. Ideally 
they will be logical, and a new 
contribution to knowledge. Be prepared 
to advance a central argument or thesis 
based on your research, and explain 
how the evidence generally confirms or 
refutes your initial suppositions. How 
would you now qualify your research 
propositions? Should you reword them 
to be more accurate? 
When it comes to the actual 
writing, you can save time by working 
on the main body of the thesis first and 
leaving the introduction and conclusion 
until the end. Remember that you can 
repeat some introductory points in your 
conclusion. 
When you do finally write the 
introduction and conclusion, consider 
any mistakes you’ve made, and what 
you would do differently now. Assess 
your method of gathering information, 
and ask yourself how would you 
improve your research process. With 
your supervisor, discuss how your 
conclusions could be fed back into 
theory. What are the theoretical 
implications of your research? 
During the 
first year or 
semester, read 
as much as 
possible. Don’t 
be shy about 




ideas on file 
cards. Throw 
most of them 
away. Follow 
your hunches. 
In the conclusion, you may 
mention what you intend to research in 
the future, knowing what you know 
now. In light of your work, indicate 
areas that are ripe for further research. 
While writing the conclusion, students 
often tend to refine their arguments 
and write excellent summaries. 
Perhaps you could move some of this 
material to the introduction, where it 
might be more useful to the reader. 
When at the final draft stage, every 
section, paragraph, and sentence should 
advance your overall argument. Excise 
any sections that are there only because 
you did the research, not because they are 
necessary to your thesis. 
Headings should explain and 
reflect the table of contents. In the 
abstract, state your argument clearly. 
Tests and evidence should be 
explained fully. Note the sources of all 
your charts and graphs. Acknowledge 
and address legitimate counter-
arguments. Summarize the debate of 
which your thesis is a part, and specify 
what previous literature it confirms or 
revises. 
Your thesis will be read by scholars 
in your field; it may also by read by 
non-specialists. It should be well 
organized and clearly presented so that 
readers may easily grasp the significant 
points. Other graduate students and 
friends can give useful advice before 
you submit your thesis. Don’t assume 
that any confusion is due to their 
stupidity or ignorance, and instead 
consider how you might constructively 
use each criticism or suggestion. 
The term “final draft” should mean 
“the best I can do”. Read your drafts 
carefully. Pages and footnotes or end-
notes should be consistently numbered. 
Your advisors will have suggestions, and 
you should feel free to debate them. But 
you have the final responsibility for 
content, presentation and errors. 
Common thesis problems During 
the first year or semester, read as 
much as possible. Don’t be shy about 
talking to your supervisor. 
Brainstorm. Write down ideas on file 
cards. Throw most of them away. 
Follow your hunches. 
It’s crucial to learn how to search 
for information using the Internet. 
Update your bibliography as you 
conduct your research, in the proper 
format on your computer. You can 
waste valuable time later looking up 
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COPRODUCTION : 
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 Write a draft once you have done 
50 percent of your research. Then fit 
your remaining research information 
into your draft. Many people continue 
to do research because they are afraid 
of writing. Remember: You do not 
have to read everything. 
Decide which style to use – Modern 
Language Association or American 
Psychological Association, making sure 
that your chosen style is acceptable by 
the official thesis guideline issued by 
your department. Be consistent, and 
footnote your sources and bibliography 
correctly from the beginning. 
Err on the side of over-footnoting. 
Study journal articles in your field to 
assess when and what they footnote. Be 
careful not to paraphrase someone’s 
analysis and pass it off as your own. If 
you have not provided evidence in the 
main body of your writing to back up an 
assertion, you can list in a footnote or 
endnote the materials that would 
buttress your argument. Statements of 
fact should be properly documented. 
Quotations and interviews need to be 
properly noted. Frequently ask yourself 
if you can footnote a comment rather 
than retain it in the main text, to 
eliminate confusion and save time. 
When explaining a concept or 
theory, such as post-modernism or 
realism, do not use critics’ 
works. Cite original authors, not 
someone else’s interpretation of 
an original idea, and footnote the 
original source. 
Tackling the first draft 
As you write the first draft, refrain 
from editing and proofreading. 
Considerable time can be wasted 
editing on the computer. If you 
dislike writing first drafts, take the 
attitude, “I’m just going to bang out a 
few pages”, and strive for at least 
three pages a day. Remember to give 
the reader signposts to indicate where 
you are going. For instance, restate 
your interpretation of the findings and 
provide conclusions that summarize 
preceding paragraphs. Use many 
headings and sub-headings. 
By the time you write the last 
chapter, the first chapter will need 
to be revised. This is not a disaster, 
and is actually expected. In fact, 
you will probably do many serious 
revisions of your entire thesis. 
Don’t be discouraged – you can get 









Your computer’s spellcheck will 
not pick up all your errors so 
carefully read your draft before 
handing it to your professor. It is 
usually better to be late than to 
submit a poorly written or unedited 
draft. You will be judged in part 
based on the clarity of your writing 
and the quality of your presentation. 
Print your work frequently. Keep 
copies of your disks and your drafts 
in different locations just in case of 
fire, tornadoes and earthquakes. For 
peace of mind, save your work every 
day. Solve any computer or printer 
problems now, not when deadlines 
loom. 
Among graduate students, pro-
crastination is common and expected, 
for a variety of reasons. To combat 
the problem, schedule rewards (such 
as exercise) after completing X hours 
of work. Study at the library with 
others. Prioritize long-term and short-
term goals. Ask for more feedback 
from your advisor. Set short-term 
deadlines. Work when you will be 
least bothered, and don’t socialize 
during study times. Reward yourself 
with lunch, coffee, a chat with a 
friend. Ask yourself whether you are 
overbooking your time because you 
are afraid to work on your top 
priority – your thesis! Just say NO! 
Another common problem is 
writer’s block. The way out of this 
one is to write anything. Write 
why you hate your research 
project. Your inner critic is fond 
of phrases such as: This is stupid! 
You don’t know anything and you 
should do more research! You 
better go back and correct that 
sentence! Tell your inner critic to 
get lost. Then write as if you were 
explaining your ideas to a friend 
or a relative, someone who is not a 
critic but a fan. 
E-mail progress reports to 
your supervisor if you cannot 
drop by frequently. Vow to keep 
in touch, especially if you are 
having problems. UA•AU 
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Thinking about Your Thesis? 
Erika Simpson 
Writing a MA thesis or PhD dissertation is a difficult and time-consuming endeavour. 
Some students produce chapters based on sound research frameworks and methodology with 
seemingly little effort or hands-on guidance. Most would-be scholars, however, struggle 
valiantly. This guideline to thinking about the MA or PhD thesis is meant to act as a map or 
compass—not a directive.1 
A Set of Questions 
The MA or PhD candidate might ponder the following set of questions before 
undertaking a thesis. Alternatively, the newly-minted professor or inexperienced thesis 
supervisor might pose these sorts of questions to the graduate student. While the MA or PhD 
candidate should not be expected to answer them all, just thinking about them beforehand, and 
discussing them with a supervisor, should help the student to write a better thesis. Variants of 
these questions may also arise during the oral defence. 
Selecting a Research Topic: 
Try to choose a topic early. Scan the latest journals and books related to your interests. 
Conduct some database searches on the Internet using key words that interest you. What are 
other researchers and academics doing in your field of interest? Has someone already written 
extensively on your favourite topic? Who are the main authors in your specialized area? 
Overview at least three other theses in your department’s collection or the university library. 
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Compared to other students, how much theory do you want to incorporate into your 
thesis? How relevant do you want your thesis topic to be? What topic might potential 
employers be interested in seeing on your resumé? 
Framing Your Research Question: 
Compose your thesis question. What is it you are specifically interested in finding out 
about? What is the problem you intend to examine? How can this topic be framed in the form of 
a question? For example, let us say you are interested in improving UN peacekeeping efforts 
and you would like to work for the United Nations. Your specific question might be: “How has 
the UN financed its peacekeeping operations?” Alternatively, you might be interested in the 
problem of nuclear proliferation. Your specific question might be: “Why did South Africa 
decide to rid itself of nuclear weapons?” Discuss your possible thesis question with others. 
Present your supervisor with a brief written statement of the problem. Define concepts 
where necessary. Express the problem in the form of a question. Can your research question be 
further narrowed down? Describe the significance of the problem with reference to one or more 
of the following criteria: Is it timely? Does it relate to a practical problem? Does it relate to an 
influential, wide or critical population? Does it fill a research gap? Does it permit generalization 
to broader theoretical principles or general theory? Does it sharpen the definition of an 
important concept or relationship? Does it have implications for a wide range of 
practical problems? 
The Theoretical Framework: 
Can your problem be related to a theoretical framework? Can the problem be related to 
previous theoretical research? What set of theoretical questions are you asking? What debate 
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in the literature are you addressing? Can your research fill a theoretical gap? Does it answer one 
or many aspects of a theoretical debate? Will you present the theory (including the 
methodology and important concepts) in a separate chapter or in parts? Will you make 
theoretical propositions in the introduction? Could you discuss theoretical implications in the 
conclusion? To what extent do you want to write a theoretical and/or policy-relevant thesis? 
Formulating Researchable Propositions: 
You may decide not to use a “positivist” framework to organize your thesis, preferring 
an alternative research methodology (e.g. “interpretive,” “critical,” “comparative,” “historical” 
approach, etc.). But by at least attempting to answer the following “positivist” (i.e. “causal,” 
“empirical,” “scientific”) questions, you should make significant progress in terms of designing 
your research project. Moreover, you may encounter a thesis examiner who wants to know, 
“What are your ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables?” 
First, could you transform your theoretical propositions into researchable propositions? 
Try to assert your propositions in the form of one-sentence “hypotheses.” Now ask the 
hypotheses in the form of questions. Do any of your propositions overlap and can any questions 
be eliminated? Do they make common sense or are they far-out and controversial? 
Although you do not need to use a positivist explanation, you should at least think about 
your possible independent, intervening, and dependent “variables.”2 What you want to explain is 
the dependent variable (B). Why does B occur? The independent variables (A) contribute to B. 
What do you suspect are the most important or significant independent variables? Can you argue 
that Given A, you expect B will occur? Are there any exceptions? Can you narrow your list of 
independent (and intervening) variables to include only those that you suspect are most 
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important and significant? Remember that a MA or PhD thesis is not supposed to be a 
magnum opus. Focus your analysis upon the variables that you suspect are most important. 
What criteria might you use to evaluate the “testability” of your research propositions? 
In other words, what kinds of evidence could you turn up to prove and disprove your 
propositions? What kinds of evidence might lead you to reject your propositions? What kind of 
evidence would you need? What sort of evidence do you expect to get? Are you looking for 
evidence stemming from individual-level, state-level or systemic-level interactions? What levels 
of analysis will you study during the research process? 
How will your present your evidence? For example, if you decide to use the case-study 
approach, why did you select your particular case studies? Was your case-selection biased? 
Recognize that many theses end-up with fewer case studies than was initially planned. Are all 
your cases well chosen? Alternatively, if the bulk of your evidence is derived from logical 
reasoning (e.g. “game theory,” “rational choice theory,” etc.), what “counter-arguments” seem 
to oppose or contradict your reasoning? On the other hand, if you are inclined to be more 
historical or interpretive, how much detailed chronological explanation do you need to provide? 
What scale will you use to “measure” significant factors or variables? (e.g. 
quantitative, semi-quantitative, qualitative?) Are you prepared to undertake the kind of research 
necessary in order to measure your variables? (e.g. mathematical, survey, public opinion, in-
depth interviews, content analysis?) Are any important concepts in need of measurement? (e.g. 
intensity, frequency, amount, number?) How will you assess the measure of change, 
significance or importance? 
Conducting Research: 
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The research process should happen all year around, not in the crucial months before 
the final deadline for submission. Do not be discouraged if, at the beginning, you are 
overwhelmed by too much information. Much of your most highly-relevant research may take 
place in the final weeks and months leading up to the penultimate draft. 
What patterns, trends, or series are you looking for during research? How are you 
going to structure your analysis of the evidence? Why? What alternatives have you 
considered? Why is your method preferable? What are its advantages and disadvantages? 
What kinds of theoretical- and policy-relevant conclusions can you draw? How 
confident are you of these conclusions given your research methodology? For instance, do 
you think 2-3 case-studies can lead to general conclusions? Is your comparative case-
study method useful? Are your logical conclusions merely commonsensical, not a new 
contribution to knowledge? 
At this stage, you should be prepared to advance a central argument or thesis based on 
your research. Does the evidence generally confirm or disconfirm your initial suppositions? How 
would you now qualify your research propositions? Should you reword them to be more 
accurate? And now that the bulk of your research is completed, what do your findings teach us? 
Do they teach us something important? Have they solved at least part of an important puzzle? 
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Introduction and Conclusion: 
Save time and refrain from writing the Introduction and Conclusion until the main body 
of the thesis is written. Remember that some of the points you make in your Introduction can be 
repeated in your Conclusion. 
When writing the Introduction and the Conclusion, you could consider the mistakes you 
made, their consequences, and seriousness. What would you do differently now that you have 
conducted the research? Assess your method of gathering information. How valid was it and 
how would you now improve your research process? With your supervisor, discuss how your 
conclusions could be fed back into theory. What theoretical implications does your research 
indicate? You could also mention how your findings could have an impact upon policy. What 
policy-relevant lessons can be learned from your research? 
In the Conclusion, you may mention what you intend to research in the future, 
knowing what you know now. In light of your work, indicate areas that are now ripe for 
further research. While writing the Conclusion, students also tend to refine their arguments 
and write excellent summaries. Could you promote some of this material to the front, where it 
might do the reader more good? 
Final Draft: 
Can you excise sections that are there only, it seems, because you did the research, 
not because they are necessary to the logic of your argument? Every section, paragraph, 
and sentence should be there only if it advances your overall argument. 
Headings need not be mere labels (e.g. “Background” or “Conclusion”) but can be 
more descriptive and precise (e.g. “Is NATO Expansion Bound to Fail?”). Do your headings 
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explain and reflect the Table of Contents? In the abstract, have you stated your argument clearly 
so that there is no confusion about what is and is not argued? Tests and evidence should be 
explained fully. Have you noted the sources of all your charts and graphs? Have you 
acknowledged and addressed legitimate counter-arguments? Have you summarized the debate 
of which your thesis is a part, and specified what previous literature it confirms or revises? 
Your thesis will be read by scholars familiar with your field of inquiry and it may also 
by read by non-specialists. Does it explain sufficient historical, technical, and theoretical 
background? Is it well-organized and clearly presented so that readers may easily grasp the 
significant points? 
Remember other graduate students and friends can give useful advice before you submit 
your thesis for formal consideration. In reacting to their comments, it is mistaken to assume that 
their confusion is due to stupidity or ignorance. What are the reasons behind their confusion? 
How might you contend with each criticism or suggestion? 
Of course, it is not a good idea to hand your friends or supervisor a manuscript with 
careless typing and spelling, single-spaced type, or faint print. The word “final draft” should 
mean “the best I can do.” Have you carefully read your drafts? Are the pages and footnotes 
or endnotes consistently numbered? Your advisors will have suggestions, and you should 
feel free to debate those suggestions and reasons. But you have the final responsibility for 
content, presentation, and errors. 
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Common Thesis Problems 
There are many well-known (and some rather unusual) techniques that can be used to 
conquer common thesis difficulties. Procrastination, in particular, can be a problem among MA 
and PhD candidates. The tips in this section are meant to help overcome standard barriers to 
thesis completion. 
Problems Framing the Research Question: 
During the first year or semester, try to read as much as possible. Browse through the 
library stacks. Scan related journal articles. Look at other MA or PhD theses for ideas about 
feasible topics. Narrow down your question as much as possible. Refrain from writing your 
magnum opus. There will be lots of time to do that later. Do not be shy to take your 
supervisor’s time. Throw around ideas. Chat. Write down your interesting ideas on filecards. 
Throw most of them away. Follow your hunches. 
Common Research Problems: 
You do not have to read everything. Over-researching is a common problem. If you 
do not know how to search for information using the Internet, make sure you ask someone to 
teach you. Most graduate students are using the World Wide Web to quickly and efficiently 
conduct research.3 Update your bibliography as you conduct your research, in the proper 
format on your computer. You can waste valuable time later looking up references you 
mislaid. Try to write a draft once you have done fifty percent of your research. Then fit your 
research information into your draft. Many people continue to do research because they are 
afraid of writing. You may need to bribe yourself to sit in front of your (blank) computer 
screen. Or force yourself to face a blank piece of paper. 
9 
Problems with Writer’s Block: 
Confronted with writer’s block, start writing anything. Write why you hate your 
research project, write a letter to a friend explaining your thesis, write your mother an 
explanation of your research question. “I hate this thesis because...” “This is a stupid topic 
because....” Tell your inner critic to get lost. Your inner critic is fond of phrases such as: 
“This is stupid!” “You don’t know anything and you should do more research!” “You better 
go back and correct that sentence!” Instead try to write as if you were explaining your ideas 
to a friend or a relative, someone who is not a critic but a fan. Also ask for your supervisor’s 
email or postal address and write progress reports if you do not have time to drop-by 
frequently, or you are shy. Vow to keep in touch with your supervisor, especially if you are 
having problems. Common Writing Mistakes: 
When explaining a concept or theory, such as “post-modernism” or “realism,” do not 
use the critics’ works to explain the concept. Take the time to examine and cite original 
authors. Moreover, do not cite someone else’s interpretation of an original idea. For example, 
do not use undergraduate texts as a source of conceptual definitions. Examine and footnote the 
original source. 
As you write the first draft, refrain from editing and proofreading. Considerable time can 
be wasted editing on the computer. If you dislike writing first drafts, take the attitude, “I’m just 
going to bang out a few pages.” Strive for at least three pages a day. Remember to give the reader 
“signposts” to indicate where you are going. For instance, restate your interpretation of the 
findings and provide conclusions that summarize preceding paragraphs. Use many headings and 
sub-headings. Remind your erstwhile reader of what has already been explained. And 
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recognize that by the time you write the last chapter, the first chapter will need to be revised. 
This is not a disaster, and is actually expected. Indeed, you will probably have to do many 
serious revisions of your entire thesis. Do not be discouraged. You can get a lot more done than 
you think you can in a short time. 
Computer Errors: 
Your computer’s spellcheck will not pick up all your spelling errors. Be sure to read over 
your draft before handing it to your professor. It is usually better to be late than to submit a 
poorly-written draft. You will be judged in part based on your writing ability. If you cannot write 
clearly, it is assumed you are not thinking clearly. Print-up your work frequently. Keep copies of 
your disks and your drafts in different locations just in case of fire, tornadoes, and earthquakes. 
For peace of mind, save your work everyday. If you are experiencing computer or printer 
problems, solve them now, not when deadlines loom. 
Style Frustrations: 
Purchase and study a style manual. Decide whether to use the Modern Language 
Association (MLA) or American Psychological Association (APA) style. Check that your 
chosen style is acceptable according to the official thesis guideline issued by your 
department or university. Be consistent and footnote your sources and bibliography 
correctly from the beginning. Do not make up your own distinctive style. For example, do 
not write pgs. instead of pp. Do not place the publisher before its location. Do not mix the 
MLA and APA documentation styles. 
Err on the side of over-footnoting, rather than under-footnoting. Study journal articles 
in your field to assess when and what they footnote. Be careful not to paraphrase someone’s 
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analysis and pass it off as your own. You cannot just change a few words here and there in a 
paragraph. If you have not provided evidence in the main body of your writing to back-up 
an assertion, you can list in a footnote or endnote the materials that would buttress your 
argument. Statements of fact should be properly documented. Quotations and interviews 
need to be properly noted. Frequently ask yourself, “Can I footnote this comment rather 
than retain it in the main text so as to eliminate confusion, save space, and retain the essay’s 
coherence?” Problems with Procrastination: 
Among graduate students, serious procrastination is common and expected. 
Why do you procrastinate? 
• Other Activities are More Interesting. Most other activities promise a shorter-term 
pay-off (e.g. movies, socializing, sports). 
• Loneliness. Studying is lonely. Being in the library is isolating. “Everybody else 
seems to be having a good time!” 
• Too Much Work. You are behind. It is hard to decide where to begin and easier not to. 
• Guilt. Other things need pressing attention. Laundry, broken-hearted friend, the dog 
needs a walk... 
• Fear of Failure. You do not understand the topic and your supervisor is confusing. 
Other graduate students seem so informed and in control. 
• Fear of Success. If you do well, everybody’s expectations will rise. You will eventually fall 
on your face and embarrass yourself because deep-down, you know you are a failure.4 By 
analyzing the reasons you procrastinate, you may be able to set-up the conditions to end 
procrastination. For example, you can schedule rewards (e.g. exercise) after completing X 
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hours of work. You can study at the library with others. You can prioritize long-term 
and short-term goals. You can ask for more feed-back from your advisor. You can build 
up your confidence by setting short-term deadlines. 
Techniques to Conquer Serious Procrastination: 
• Just Do It! Prioritize. 
Get an egg-timer and apportion your time. Work when you will be least bothered. Do 
not get sidetracked and socialize during study times. Reward yourself with short-term rewards 
(e.g. lunch, coffee, cigarette, chat). Keep asking yourself, “Does this activity help me achieve 
my top priorities?” 
• Punish or Reward Yourself! 
If procrastination is a serious problem, rewards may not be sufficiently compelling, and 
you may have to resort to punishment. As it is difficult to punish yourself, you may need to get 
someone else to do it for you. Write cheques to your least favourite organization. Give them to 
your supervisor or a friend. If you do not complete a page, paragraph or chapter by the 
deadline, s/he starts mailing cheques...$200 later, you may start writing! 
• Just Say No! 
When asked to make other commitments, say “I’ll think about it” instead. If pressed, do a 
little something but not a lot. Continually ask yourself whether you are overbooking your 
time because you are afraid to work on your top priority (your thesis!) 
• Banish worry thoughts! Get to the task! 
Do a little bit at least. Divide the task into smaller chunks. Substitute the mental message, “I 
should...” with “I’d like to...” Write down all the worst things that could happen on pieces of 
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paper. Put them aside. Read them a few months later. You will see that the worst things did not 
happen. Life is a series of problems but the worst scenario seldom materializes. And if it does, 
you will manage because you have inner reserves. 
• Strive to Stay Balanced! 
Smile! Get regular exercise. Eat properly. Do not burn the candle at both ends! 
Put silly sticky notes and visual reminders everywhere: “Do not worry, be happy,” “This too 
will pass,” and “In the giant cosmos of things, this is totally unimportant”. Memorize this poem 
by Goethe, one of the world’s most beloved and prolific authors: “What you can do or dream 
you can, begin it! Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it. Only engage and the mind 
grows heated. Begin it and the work will be completed!” 
I WOULD PREFER IF YOU CUT THE FOLLOWING... 
Coping with Family, Friends, and Partners 
Despite their best intentions, friends, relatives, and life partners can hinder the steady 
progress of the “All-But-Dissertation” (ABD) student. These ten rules, written tongue-in-cheek, 
could be tactfully distributed by the ABD as part of a coping strategy or politely proffered by the 
concerned supervisor as a prelude to a serious discussion of the difficult problems that bedevil 
many graduate students: 
Your ABD (All-But-Dissertation) Plant: 10 Rules For Care and Feeding 
1. Think of your ABD as a tender seedling that needs plenty of water and 
careful tending before it grows into a sturdy MA sapling or PhD tree. 
2. Expect your ABD will be susceptible to frequent bouts of procrastination, 
depression, and “lackadaisicalness.” Sometimes an ABD plant will wilt, despite the best 
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growing conditions. However, often an ABD will shoot upwards, exhibiting a surprising growth 
spurt in understanding. (The reasons for such rapid bursts of growth remain inexplicable). 
3. Talk to your ABD plant. But do not focus upon the ABD’s dissertation, its rate of 
progress, and when, exactly, it will finish growing. Instead talk to the ABD about pleasantries 
such as Mozart, puppies, gardening, and flowers. 
4. Remember that if you were never an ABD, you have no idea of what it is really like. 
Even if everyone in your garden plot was an ABD, and you grew up surrounded by ABDs, you 
will not completely understand the growth process. Whereas you may suspect you would 
complete a thesis more speedily and efficiently, telling your ABD this will not help it grow more 
quickly. 
5. Some ABDs grow to fruition more quickly than others. Many are stymied by poor 
soil conditions (e.g. lack of money), overcrowding (e.g. more family members), looming shade 
(e.g. loneliness) and overbearing heat (e.g. demanding friends and lovers). Sometimes ABDs 
overcome one problem simply to encounter another. Often what seems an insurmountable 
barrier to the ABD really isn’t—if the ABD decides to grow over it. 
6. The best growing environment for the ABD is simply to be left alone. Solitude. Time 
to focus on the primary task. The ABD impacted by too many earthly concerns cannot use finite 
amounts of energy properly and may not grow—may even fall over and decompose. 
7. If you are a gardener in the ABD’s plot of life, refrain from prodding, cutting-up or 
transplanting the ABD. Do not abruptly move your ABD to a different location or transplant the 
ABD into a larger, more expensive plot. If the ABD requires different growing conditions, the 
ABD will make them known—in any case, ABDs need very little to grow. 
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8. Recognize that most ABDs will attempt to grow in many directions at the same time. 
Often an ABD digresses into growing leaflets, expanding root systems, or meanders in different 
directions. Frequently inquire of your ABD whether this activity is necessary for proper growth: 
“Do you really need to do this now?” If the ABD is ambivalent, assist your ABD to resist these 
energy-wasters. 
9. Have faith that one day, your ABD may bear fruit. It is as if the ABD has an invisible 
biological time-clock. An ABD driven by this time-clock will strive to meet deadlines, even those 
that are self-imposed. Stern admonitions, pointed reminders, and poignant tears, however, will not 
help the ABD to reach this final growth spurt more quickly. Indeed, too much prodding or 
chiding, and the ABD may grow away from you. 
10. Be aware that the ABD that grows overly slowly may have to make way for other 
rapidly growing ABDs. For such an ABD, earthly existence will appear disappointing; good 
ideas fail to germinate; the fruit of long labour begins to rot. On the other hand, with careful 
attention and feeding, and a root structure firmly embedded in a deep understanding of the field, 
your MA sapling or your PhD tree will flower abundantly, bear fruitful ideas, spread hundreds 
of seedlings, and scatter many pages of leaves. 
1This article contains personal advice and recommendations based on my experience and the experience of 
others engaged in writing theses or supervising graduate students. The views expressed are not necessarily the 
views of any department or university. The author would like to thank the following professors for useful 
suggestions, as well as advice on earlier drafts of this paper: Thomas Homer-Dixon, Michael Keating, David 
Langille, H. Peter Langille, Sid Noel, Cranford Pratt, Paul Pross, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Graham Simpson, 
and Janice Stein. Useful tips were also put forward by professors and graduate students in the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Western Ontario during the 1995-99 Political Science 
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MA Workshops. Thank you to these workshop attendees for their tips. If you have other suggestions, 
please email me at Simpson@julian.uwo.ca 
2
 On the difference between independent, intervening, and dependent variables, see for example, Earl 
Babbie The Practice of Social Research 3rd ed., (Wadsworth Publishing Company: Belmont, California), 
1983 and Kjell Erik Rudestam & Rae R. Newton Surviving the Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to 
Content and Process (Sage Publications: Newbury Park, California), 1992, ch. 2, pp. 11-16. 
3
 For example, “Northernlights” at http://www.northernlight.com/docs/aboutintro.htm is an outstanding new 
search engine for scholars and researchers. It searches over 3000 scholarly journals and magazines in its 
Special Collection, as well as the World Wide Web. One-sentence abstracts of scholarly articles are sorted 
into customized folders. 
4
 These reasons for procrastination are summarized from Joan Fleet, Fiona Goodchild, Richard 
Zajchowski Learning for Success: Skills and Strategies for Canadian Students (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich), 1990, ch. 3, pp. 25-34. 
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